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1 Introduction
In 1980, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated
Rule 14e-3' pursuant to the authority that Congress granted to it in Sec-
tion 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act).2 Rule 14e-3
mandates that a person who possesses material nonpublic information relating
to a tender offer 3 must either disclose the information or abstain from trading
in the affected stock.4 On August 2, 1996, in United States v. O'Hagan,5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that the SEC
exceeded its authority under the Act by promulgating Rule 14e-3 without
including a breach of fiduciary duty requirement for nondisclosure cases.'
The Eighth Circuit's ruling conflicted directly with decisions from the United
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1997).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
3. See Samuel N. Allen, Note, The Scope ofthe Disclosure Duty Under SECRule 14e-3,
38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1055, 1055 n.2 (1981) (defining tender offer as "a method of
corporate takeover in which a bidder offers to purchase shares of a target corporation at a
premium price provided the target's shareholders sell a specified number of shares" (citing
TakeoverBids: Hearing onH.R. 14475andS. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin.
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong. 11 (1968) [hereinafter
1968 House Hearings] (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, SEC Chairman))).
4. See SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that "Rule 14e-3 creates
a duty to disclose material non-public information, or abstain from trading in stocks implicated
by an impending tender offer, regardless of whether such information was obtained through a
breach of a fiduciary duty"); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (stating that "[o]ne violates Rule 14e-3(a) if he trades on the basis of material nonpublic
information concerning a pending tender offer that he knows or has reason to know has been
acquired 'directly or indirectly' from an insider of the offeror or issuer, or someone working
on their behalf" and that rule "creates a duty in those traders who fall within its ambit to abstain
or disclose, without regard to whether the trader owes a pre-existing fiduciary duty to respect
the confidentiality of the information"); see also SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir.
1992) (quoting Chestman, 947 F.2d at 557).
5. 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
6. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612,627 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that "the SEC
exceeded its rulemaking authority under § 14(e) when it promulgated Rule 14e-3(a) without
including a requirement of a breach of a fiduciary obligation"), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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States Courts of Appeals for the Second,7 Seventh,8 and Tenth Circuits,9
which all found Rule 14e-3 to be a valid exercise of the SEC's Section 14(e)
rulemaking authority." On June 25, 1997, the Supreme Court settled the
longstanding conflict," reversing the Eighth Circuit's ruling in O'Hagan and
7. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 559 (stating that promulgating Rule 14e-3 was within
SEC's authority under Section 14(e)).
8. See Maio, 51 F.3d at 635 (stating that promulgating Rule 14e-3 was within SEC's
authority under Section 14(e)).
9. See Peters, 978 F.2d at 1165 (stating that promulgating Rule 14e-3 was within SEC's
authority under Section 14(e)).
10. Compare O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 614 (finding that SEC exceeded its Section 14(e)
rulemaking authority when it promulgated Rule 14e-3 and "omitted therefrom the requirement
that a breach of a fiduciary duty must be shown in order to violate the rule"), with SEC v. Maio,
51 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Rule 14e-3 creates a duty to disclose material nonpublic
information, or abstain from trading in stocks implicated by an impending tender offer,
regardless of whether such information was obtained through a breach of a fiduciary duty."),
SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that "Rule 14e-3, as written - i.e.,
with no fiduciary duty requirement - is within the SEC's statutory rulemaking authority"), and
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 562 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (asserting that
Rule 14e-3 "creates a duty in those traders who fall within its ambit to abstain or disclose,
without regard to whether the trader owes a pre-existing fiduciary duty to respect the
confidentiality of the information").
11. Compare Dennis J. Block&Nancy E. Barton, SecuritiesLitigation: Insider Trading -
The Need for Legislation, 10 SEc. REG. L.J. 350, 365-67 (1983) (questioning validity of
Rule 14e-3 based on relationship with Section 10(b) and Supreme Court decision in Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)), and Douglas M. Branson, Discourse on the Supreme
CourtApproach to SEC Rule JOb-5 and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263, 281 n.93 (1981)
(debating whether Rule 14e-3 could withstand Supreme Court scrutiny), and Samuel H. Gruen-
baum, Acquisitions andMergers: The New Disclose or Abstain from Trading Rule, 4 CORP. L.
REV. 350,352-55 (1981) (asserting that SEC's promulgation of Rule 14e-3 may not be legal),
and Harry Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" Versus Economic Theory,
37 Bus. LAW. 517,546 (1982) (questioning legality of Rule 14e-3 after Chiarella), andJanell
M. Kurtz & Bradley J. Sleeper, Fraud Liability for Outsider Trading: SEC Rule 14e-3 in
Limbo, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 691, 693 (1992) (arguing that Rule 14e-3 is invalid based on Supreme
Court's holdings in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) and Chiarella),
andRichard M. Phillips, Insider Trading Liability-After Dirks, 16 REv. SEC. REG. 841,847-48
(1983) (contending that Rule 14e-3 conflicts with holdings of Chiarella and Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 665 (1983)), and William K.S. Wang, Recent Developments in the Federal Law
Regulating Stock Market Inside Trading, 6 CORP. L. REv. 291, 306-08 (1983) (describing
unsettled issue of legality of Rule 14e-3), andAllen, supra note 3, at 1062-65 (concluding that
Congress did not intend to regulate corporate outsiders through Williams Act or its
amendments), and William J. Cook, Note, From Insider Trading to Unfair Trading: Chestman
1 andRule 14e-3, 22 STETsoNL. REv. 171,208 (1992) (claiming Rule 14e-3 is outside SEC's
authority), and Mary F. Hill, Note, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information Under
Rule 14e-3, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 539,556-57 (1981) (acknowledging that Supreme Court
may not be sympathetic to Rule 14e-3), and Mark A. Kahrs, Note, Is the Securities and Ex-
change Commission Overreaching its RulemakingAuthority UnderRule 14e-3?, 30 WASHBURN
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finding that Rule 14e-3 was consistent with its enabling statute. 2
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court ignored a fundamental rule
of administrative law by evaluating the validity of Rule 14e-3 on a basis other
than the one that the SEC provided at the time of the original rulemaking
action. 3 When the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3, it claimed that it was
exerting its alleged power under Section 14(e) to redefine "fraud" in the
tender offer context.14 The Court, however, reviewed the SEC's action under
the assumption that the SEC had applied "prophylactic" rulemaking authority
under Section 14(e)." Based on the premise that the SEC possesses the power
to regulate acts that are not themselves fraudulent as a reasonable means to
prevent acts that are fraudulent, the Court found Rule 14e-3 to be valid. 6 In
so doing, the Court impermissibly altered the traditional framework for
analyzing the validity of agency action by employing a post hoc rationaliza-
tion to justify the SEC's rulemaking.' 7
This Note explores the Supreme Court's flawed analysis in O 'Hagan and
presents an evaluation of the validity of Rule 14e-3 under the appropriate
interpretive framework. Part II of this Note discusses the foundation for the
L.J. 300, 323 (1991) (alleging that SEC's promulgation of Rule 14e-3 violates its statutory
authority), with United States v. Marcus Schloss & Co., 710 F. Supp. 944,955-57 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (finding that Rule 14e-3 falls within Congress's broad delegation ofrulemaking authority
to SEC), and United States v. Chestman, 704 F. Supp. 451, 454-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same),
rev'd, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated inpart en banc, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), and
Susan Lorde Martin, Insider Trading and Rule 14e-3 After Chestman, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 665,
668 (1992) (arguing that SEC was within its authority when it promulgated Rule 14e-3).
12. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2219 (1997) (reversing Eighth
Circuit's ruling and upholding validity of Rule 14e-3).
13. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1946) (describing principle that courts
can only review agency action on basis that agency stated as "simple but fundamental rule of
administrative law").
14. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2228 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the Rule,
on its face, does not purport to be an exercise of the Commission's prophylactic power, but
rather a redefinition of what 'constitute[s] a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or
practice within the meaning of§ 14(e)"' (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1997))). But see
id. at 2218 n.19 ("Logically and practically, such a rule may be conceived and defended,
alternatively, as definitional or preventive.").
15. See id. at 2217 (deciding not to address defining power argument and instead looking
to Government's prophylactic power rationale).
16. See id. at 2219 (finding that "Rule 14e-3(a) is a proper exercise of the Commission's
prophylactic power under § 14(e)"). But see id. at 2228 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contending
that prophylactic argument fails on merits).
17. See id. at 2228 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("We evaluate regulations not based on the
myriad of explanations that could have been given by the relevant agency, but on those
explanations and justifications that were, in fact, given."); see also Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196
(stating that courts must review agency action based upon grounds that agency provided).
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delegation of power from Congress to administrative agencies and the tradi-
tional analytical structure for assessing whether a particular rule extends
invalidly beyond an agency's enabling statutes."8 In Part III, this Note exam-
ines the debate surrounding Rule 14e-3 by addressing the legislative history
of Section 14(e), the relevance of Rule 1Ob-5 and Section 10(b) of the Act,'9
and the split between United States Circuit Courts of Appeals over the validity
of Rule 14e-3.2 Part IV discusses the majority opinion of the Supreme Court
in O'Hagan2" and its problematic new test for evaluating agency compliance
with enabling statutes.22 Part V provides an assessment of the validity of
Rule 14e-3 under the proper analytical framework.'
I. Delegation of Power from Congress to Agencies
The first sentence of the body of the Constitution provides: "All legisla-
tive Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States... ,,24 The Supreme Court has held that Congress nevertheless may
delegate this constitutional power.' By dispensing authority to administrative
agencies, Congress utilizes the expertise of these agencies, conserves congres-
sional resources, and maintains legislative flexibility in the face of changing
conditions and technology.26 This capacity to delegate power, however, is not
unlimited; Congress must fix the "primary standard" under which its delegee
may act.27 Administrative agencies, therefore, as Congress's delegees, derive
18. See infra notes 24-40 and accompanying text (discussing delegation of authority from
Congress to administrative agencies and outlining steps for determining validity of agency
action).
19. See infra notes 41-80 and accompanying text (presenting general legislative history
of § 14e-3 and Rule 14e-3 and analyzing their relationship with Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
20. See infra notes 81-148 and accompanying text (discussing circuit court cases that
created split over validity of Rule 14e-3).
21. See infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text (analyzing Supreme Court opinion in
o 'Hagan).
22. See infra notes 161-87 and accompanying text (challenging legitimacy of"new test"
for evaluating validity of agency action and critiquing Court's application of test).
23. See infra notes 188-271 and accompanying text (presenting test of compliance of
Rule 14e-3 with enabling statute using traditional analysis).
24. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
25. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1, 43 (1825) (stating that "Congress
may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself').
26. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLi A T. MAYTON, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW 10-12
(1993) (describing benefits of delegation to agencies).
27. See United States v. Shreveport Grain& ElevatorCo., 287 U.S. 77,85 (1932) (stating
that "Congress may declare its will, and after fixing a primary standard, devolve upon
administrative officers the 'power to fill up the details"').
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their power solely from express congressional grants of authority limited by
the primary standard set out in their enabling statutes.28 An agency's power
to create rules is not the power to make law.29 Instead, the delegation of
rulemaking authority requires an agency to implement the expressed will of
Congress.30 Courts concordantly strike down agency action that is inconsis-
tent with the applicable enabling statute as ultra vires.3" Nonetheless, courts
may grant "more than mere deference or weight" to an agency's interpretation
of its own administrative authority.32
28. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 75 (4th ed. 1994)
(stating that "statute is the source of agency authority as well as of its limits"); see also Lyng
v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986) (stating that agency may not exceed power delegated in
enabling statute).
29. See Ernst& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213 (1976) ("The rulemaking power
granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not
the power to make law."). Withoutthis limitation, an agency would possess unbridled authority
to confer power upon itself and to "override Congress." See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374-75 (1986) (describing repercussion of allowing agencies to act in
excess of enabling statute).
30. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965) (stating that enabling statutes
grant agencies "the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as
expressed by the statute" (quoting Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129,
134 (1936))).
31. See Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(2)(C), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1994)
(providing mechanism for courts to review and to set aside agency action in excess of statutory
authority); Transohio Say. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 621
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that courts must invalidate action beyond delegated authority); Steele
v. FCC, 770 F.2d. 1192, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (providing that judge must make ultimate
determination); Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1995,48 ADMIN. L. REV.
399,406 (1996) (characterizing truism that regulations may not be ultravires of enabling statute
as "basic"). An administrative agency exceeds its statutory authority if it promulgates a rule
that is "inconsistent with the statutory mandate or frustrate[s] the policy Congress sought to
implement." Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 143 (1984) (quoting
FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981)).
32. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977) (describing substantial
deference courts should give to agency's application of statutory authority); see also
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex reL Moore, 487 U.S. 354,381 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (stating that "it is plain that giving deference to an administrative interpretation
of its statutory jurisdiction or authority is both necessary and appropriate"); Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (stating that
when "Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation" and that
"such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute"); NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 830 n.7
(1984) (noting that Court has never found exception to normal deference owed to agency for
situations when NLRB interprets coverage of its own enabling act). But see Board of Gov-
ernors, FRS v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986) ("The traditional deference
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Courts apply a two-step test when they review an agency's construction
of its enabling statute.33 First, a reviewing court must evaluate whether the
agency's action and interpretation are in accord with Congress's intent in
passing the enabling provision.34 To determine Congress's intent, courts apply
"traditional tools of statutory construction;" 35 specifically, courts look to the
language of the statute,36 the legislative history behind the statute37 and the
policy behind the statute.38 Second, if the intent of Congress is unclear, a
court must determine if the agency's action represented a reasonable construc-
tion of the enabling provision.39 In applying this two-pronged test, a court
courts pay to agency interpretation is not to be applied to alter the clearly expressed intent of
Congress."); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
467 (1987) (arguing that deference to administrators with regard to their own authority violates
principles of separation of powers); Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A
Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 986, 1005-06 (1987)
(asserting that courts should not defer to agencies when situation involves "agency
aggrandizement"). "A reviewing court is not free to set aside those regulations simply because
it would have interpreted the statute in a different manner." Batterton, 432 U.S. at 425. An
administrative rule may be set aside "only if the [agency] exceeded [its] statutory authority or
if the regulation is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."' Id. at 426 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C)).
33. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984) (outlining two-pronged test for review of agency construction of enabling statute).
34. See id. at 842-43 ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.").
35. Id. at 843 n.9; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,446 (1987) (applying
"traditional tools of statutory construction" to assess congressional intent in validity of agency
action case).
36. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859-62 (addressing statutory language to determine con-
gressional intent); see also KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,291 (1988) (stating that
reviewing court first must look to plain meaning of statute, particular statutory language in
question, and language and design of statute in entirety); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S.
528, 538-39 (1955) (stating that courts must "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word
of a statute" when they address language to determine intent of Congress (quoting Montclair
v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882))).
37. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862-64 (discussing legislative history to determine congres-
sional intent); see also K Mart, 486 U.S. at 300 (same); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449
(same).
38. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-66 (1984) (considering policy behind statute to deter-
mine congressional intent); see also K Mart, 486 U.S. at 300 (looking to purpose of statute to
determine congressional intent).
39. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (stating that "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute").
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must review the agency's action based on the reasoning that the agency
provided.40
III. The Debate over the Validity of Rule 14e-3
A. Section 14(e), Rule 14e-3, and Their Relation to Section 10(h)
and Rule JOb-5
In the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash, Congress enacted
Section 10(b) of the Act4 as part of a wave of federal legislation intended to
address the insufficiency of the common law in protecting investors from
insider trading.42 Section 10(b) grants the SEC power to regulate manipula-
tive or deceptive devices connected with securities transactions in an attempt
to preserve the public interest and to protect investors.4' Based on this author-
ity, the SEC promulgated Rule 1 Ob-5,44 a general antifraud provision that the
40. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (noting fundamental principle
of administrative law). The Supreme Court stated:
[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, mustjudge the propriety of such
action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are
inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action
by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.
Id.
41. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section 10(b)
of the Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
42. See Sean P. Leuba, Note, The Fourth Circuit Breaks Ranks in United States v. Bryan:
Finally, a Repudiation of the Misappropriation Theory, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1152-
53 (1996) (describing impetuses behind enactment of Securities Act of 1933 and Act).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997). Rule lob-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
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SEC utilizes to enforce the prohibition on insider trading.45 Rule 1 Ob-5 pro-
scribes the employment of schemes to defraud, the communication of mislead-
ing statements, and the engagement in fraudulent or deceitful acts.46
In March 1980, the Supreme Court found in Chiarella v. United States
47
that parties in securities transactions cannot violate Rule 1Ob-5 due to their
nondisclosure of material nonpublic information unless there is a breach of a
fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties to the transaction.
The Court looked to the common-law use of the word "fraud" to determine the
scope of the powers that Congress delegated to the SEC in Section 10(b). 49
Accordingly, the Court found that "one who fails to disclose material informa-
tion prior to consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is
under a duty to do so."5 In Chiarella, petitioner Vincent Chiarella acquired
nonpublic material information through his employment with a financial
printer and purchased stock based on the information." Chiarella, as a corpo-
rate outsider 2 and complete stranger to the sellers of the stock, had no duty
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit on any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
45. See Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-
ChiarellaRestatement, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982) (discussing SEC's use of Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 to enforce prohibition against insider trading).
46. See supra note 44 (providing text of Rule lOb-5).
47. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
48. Chiarellav. United States, 445 U.S. 222,230-35 (1980) (finding that duty to disclose
under Rule lob-5 arises only when fiduciary duty exists between parties to transaction).
Vincent Chiarella worked as a "markup man" in the New York composing room of Pandick
Press, a financial printer. Id. at 224. During the course of his employment, Chiarella handled
printing work for four corporate takeover bids and a corporate merger. Id. & n.1. Although
the names of the parties to the takeovers were concealed until the night of the final printing,
Chiarella was able to determine the identities of the target corporations from other information
in the preliminary copies of the documents. Id. Based on this knowledge and without
disclosing the information, Chiarella purchased shares of the target companies prior to the
public announcement of the takeover attempts and sold them immediately thereafter. Id. Using
this scheme over the course of fourteen months, Chiarella reaped gains of more than $30,000.
Id. Subsequently, the government indicted Chiarella on seventeen counts of violating
Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5. Id. at 225. Chiarella was tried and convicted on all counts. Id.
The Second Circuit rejected his appeal. Id.
49. Id. at 227-28.
50. Id. at 228.
51. Id. at224.
52. See id. at 231-33 (stating that Chiarella was not corporate insider and thus had no
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to disclose the information to the sellers because he was not their agent,
fiduciary, or an individual in whom they placed their trust. 3 The Court
reversed Chiarella's convictions because, "[w]hen an allegation of fraud is
based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak."54 A
Rule 1Ob-5 conviction for nondisclosure in the absence of a breach of a
fiduciary duty between securities transaction participants "would be inconsis-
tent with the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of the
securities markets.""5 The Supreme Court followed Chiarella's reasoning
three years later in Dirks v. SEC. 6
affirmative duty to disclose information). In determining the definition of "insider" for the
purpose of establishing identities of those to whom Rule lOb-5 applies, Justice Powell, the
author of the Chiarella opinion, stated that "[tihe Commission emphasized that the duty arose
from (i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider
to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure." Id. at 227 (citing In re
Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 & n.15 (1961)).
53. Id. at 232-33.
54. Id. at 235.
55. Id. at 235. The Court noted that "Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall pro-
vision, but what it catches must be fraud.... [T]here can be no fraud [based on nondisclosure]
absent a duty to speak." Id. at 234-35.
56. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983) (finding that there can be no violation
of Rule lob-5 for nondisclosure without breach of fiduciary duty). Raymond Dirks was
working for a New York broker-dealer firm when Ronald Secrist approached him with
information about a corporation named Equity Funding of America (Equity Funding). Id. at
648-49. Secrist, a former Equity Funding officer, told Dirks that Equity Funding's corporate
assets were overstated due to fraudulent corporate tactics. Id. at 649. Secrist urged Dirks to
research the allegations and expose the fraud. Id. Dirks traveled to Equity Funding's head-
quarters in Los Angeles where the management of the corporation denied any fraud, but other
employees confirmed Secrist's allegations. Id. Dirks urged William Blundell, Los Angeles
bureau chief of the Wall Street Journal, to expose the fraud, but Blundell refused. Id. at 649-50.
During Dirks' two-week investigation, he spoke with a number of clients and investors,
including some who had holdings in Equity Funding, about the information he had uncovered.
Id. at 649. Among the people with whom Dirks spoke, five were investment advisors who
liquidated more than $16 million in Equity Funding securities. Id. Neither Dirks nor his firm
owned or traded any Equity Funding securities during this time. Id. Over the course of Dirks's
investigation, Equity Funding's stock price fell from $26 per share to less than $15 per share
before the SEC halted trading. Id. at 650. Subsequently, California insurance authorities
uncovered evidence of fraud in Equity Funding's records, the SEC filed a complaint, and the
Wall Street Journal published the story on the front page. Id. The SEC also investigated Dirks
and found that by relaying the allegations of fraud to the investment community, he violated
various securities laws, including Rule lOb-5. Id. at 650-51. On review, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit entered judgment against Dirks for the
reasons the SEC stated. Id. at 652. The Supreme Court, however, reversed Dirks's conviction.
Id. at 667. In an opinion written by Justice Powell (the author of the Chiarella opinion), the
Court found that Dirks could not violate Rule lOb-5 absent a duty to disclose or abstain from
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In response to the Supreme Court's Chiarella decision, 7 the SEC as-
serted its Section 14(e) 8 rulemaking authority and promulgated Rule 14e-3.59
use of the inside information. Id. The Court reasoned that failing to require a breach of a
fiduciary duty would impose "a general duty between all participants in market transactions to
forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information." Id. at 654-55 (quoting Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222,233 (1980)). The creation of such a general duty would "depar[t]
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two
parties." Id. at 654-55 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233).
57. See Wang, supra note 11, at 308 (finding that SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3 in
response to Chiarella); Hill, supra note 11, at 539 (same).
58. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994). Section 14(e)
of the Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading,
or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any
solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer,
request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection,
by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Id Section 14(e), consistent with the general rulemaking power that Section 23(a)(1) of the Act
authorizes, grants the SEC authority to create rules and regulations for the purpose of
preventing insider trading violations relating to tender offers. See United States v. Chestman,
947 F.2d 551, 556-57 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (asserting that Sections 14(e) and 23(a)(1) are
enabling statutes for Rule 14e-3). Section 23(a)(1) authorizes the SEC "to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter for
which [it is] responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in [it] by this chapter." 15
U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1997).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1997). Rule 14e-3(a) states:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of Section 14(e) of the
Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating to
such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic
and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly
from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner, or employee or any other person acting on
behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be
purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities convertible into or
exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose
of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any
purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press
release or otherwise.
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Congress enacted the first sentence of Section 14(e) in 1968 as part of the
Williams Act,6" with the purpose of providing investors with full disclosure
for tender offers.61 In so doing, Congress strove to protect market participants
from unfair trading practices.6' Congress added the second sentence of Sec-
60. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, sec. 3(e), § 14(e), 82 Stat. 454, 457 (1968)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994)).
61. See S. REP. No. 90-550, at 3 (1967) (noting that purpose of bill was to provide
investors with full and fair disclosure in tender offer situations); H.R. REP. No. 90-1711, at 4
(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2813 (finding that "[w]hile the bill may dis-
courage tender offers or other attempts to acquire control by some who are unwilling to expose
themselves to the light of disclosure, the committee believes this is a small price to pay for
adequate investor protection"); Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in
Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities ofthe Senate
Committee onBankingand Currency, 90th Cong. 44 (1967) [hereinafter 1967Senate Hearings]
(statement of Sen. Kuchel) (asserting that purpose of bill was to insure disclosure of adequate
information to investors); 113 CONG. REc. 854, 854-55 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams)
(outlining twin policies of Williams Act by stating that "[t]he purpose of this bill is to require
full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time providing the
offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case"); see also Schreiber v.
Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) ("The purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that
public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be
required to respond without adequate information." (quoting Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,
422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975))); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26-35 (1977) (discussing
legislative history of Williams Act and concluding that "[t]he legislative history thus shows that
the sole purpose of the Williams Act was the protection of investors who are confronted with
a tender offer"); United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that
Congress delegated Section 14(e) power to SEC to protect investors), vacated inpart en banc,
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(same).
62. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 61, at 205 (statement of Manuel F. Cohen,
SEC Chairman) (expressing concern about protection of shareholders); id. at 57 (statement of
Samuel L. Hayes III, Professor of Finance, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University)
(claiming that investors, rather than bidders or defending management, need protection in
tender offer situations); 113 CONG. REc. 854, 857-58 (1967) (statement of Sen. Kuchel)
(voicing concern about protecting investors and target companies); Lyman Johnson & David
Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1862, 1896-97 (1989) (noting that in
Williams Act, Congress established position of"neutrality" toward desirability of tender offers
and "sought simply to make sure that target company shareholders would have sufficient
disclosure and procedural protection to respond rationally if and when tender offers occurred").
By regulating activities related to tender offers, Congress intended to preserve the integrity of
the takeover market by ensuring that investors remained confident that parties with inside
information were not manipulating stock prices. See 1968 House Hearings, supra note 3, at
44-45 (statement ofDonald L. Calvin, Vice President, New York Stock Exchange) (expressing
concern about adverse affects on market due to investors trading on material nonpublic
information derived from information leaks and from rumors preceding tender offer
announcements); 113 CONG. REc. 24,662, 24,665 (1967) (statement of Sen. Kuchel) (asserting
that "passage of S. 510 [Williams Act] will revitalize the strength, vitality, and integrity of our
entire securities system").
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tion 14(e) in 1970.3 The sponsor of the 1970 amendment to the Williams Act,
New Jersey Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., argued that Congress should
grant the SEC extensive rulemaking authority to provide the agency with the
flexibility to address rapidly changing corporate takeover techniques.'
Based on these first two sentences, Section 14(e) has three distinct
aspects. 5 First, Section 14(e) prohibits any person from making false or
misleading statements.6 Second, Section 14(e) prohibits any person from
engaging in "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices."'67 Third,
Section 14(e) authorizes the SEC to "define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative."6 As a product of the SEC's Section 14(e) power, Rule 14e-3
establishes a "disclose-or-abstain" requirement by mandating that any person
with material, nonpublic information regarding an impending tender offer
either disclose the information publicly or abstain from trading in the stock of
corporations involved in the offer.69
In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,70 the Supreme Court stated that
Section 14(e) added a "'broad antifraud prohibition,' modeled on the antifraud
provisions of § 10(b) of the Act and Rule lOb-5.,, 7' The timing of the SEC
63. See Act of December 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, sec. 5, § 14(e), 84 Stat. 1497,
1497-98 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994)) (providing amendment to Section 14(e)); see
also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551,557 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (describing history
of Section 14(e)).
64. See 116 CoNG.REC. 29,251,29,252 (1970) (statement ofSen. Williams) (arguingthat
additional rulemaking power in 1970 amendment was necessary for SEC to deal with changing
takeover methods and defenses). Senator Williams argued that with increased power, the SEC
could adequately protect investors from unfair trading activities by ensuring that all investors
had equal access to material information. See id. at 29,253 (statement of Sen. Williams)
(contending that amendment to Williams Act would guarantee that all investors had equal
access to material information regarding tender offers).
65. Mark J. Loewenstein, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the Rule 10b-5
Comparisons, 71 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1330-31 (1983) (describing three aspects of Section 14(e));
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994) (providing text of Section 14(e)).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994); Loewenstein, supra note 65, at 1330.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994); Loewenstein, supra note 65, at 1330.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994); Loewenstein, supra note 65, at 1330-31.
69. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1997) (providing text of Rule 14e-3); see also SEC v.
Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing duty under Rule 14e-3 for those in
possession of material nonpublic information to either disclose information or abstain from
trading in implicated stocks regardless of existence of fiduciary duty); United States v. Chest-
man, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (same); Allen, supra note 3, at 1055 (same).
70. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
71. Schreiber v. BurlingtonN., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977)). In December 1982, Burlington Northern, Inc. (Burlington)
proposed, through a hostile tender offer, to purchase 25.1 million El Paso Gas Co. (El Paso)
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action, coupled with the similarities in language and legislative intent, have
led some courts and commentators to draw parallels between Rule 1 Ob-5 and
Rule 14e-3.72 Arguably, the close connection between the two provisions
enables courts properly to draw on precedent interpreting Section 10(b) and
Rule 1 Ob-5 when faced with Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 issues.73
Nevertheless, reasons existto maintain a separation between the Sections
and corresponding Rules. First, the two rules are subject to different interpre-
tations because the SEC intended for them to address different securities fraud
situations.7' Additionally, the congressional intent underlying Section 14(e)
shares at $24 per share. Id. at 2-3. Initially, El Paso management opposed the takeover, but its
shareholders chose to subscribe to the offer. Id. at 3. In January 1983, however, Burlington
decided not to accept the tendered shares and instead announced a "new and friendly takeover
agreement." Id. The new agreement contained provisions that rescinded the previous tender
offer, called for the purchase of 4,166,667 shares at $24 per share, substituted a tender offer for
only 21 million shares at $24 per share, provided protection against a "squeeze-out merger," and
approved "golden parachute" contracts for four senior El Paso officers. Id. at 3-4. Burlington
completed the takeover as El Paso shareholders tendered more than 40 million shares in
response to Burlington's new offer. Id. at 4. Because of this oversubscription, shareholders
who retendered after the retraction of the first offer received substantial proration to which they
would not have been subjected under the first offer. Id. at 4. Barbara Schreiber, a shareholder,
filed suit alleging that Burlington, El Paso, and members of El Paso's board of directors
violated Section 14(e) of the Act by engaging in "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts
or practices ... in connection with any tender offer." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994)).
Schreiber claimed that Burlington's retraction of its original tender offer, its submission of a
replacement offer, and its failure to disclose the "golden parachute" contract agreements manip-
ulated the market for El Paso stock. Id. The district court dismissed the suit because it found
that"the alleged manipulation did not involve amisrepresentation, and so did not violate § 14(e)."
Id. After addressing the legislative history and congressional intent behind Section 14(e), the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that manipulation under Sec-
tion 14(e) requires misrepresentation or nondisclosure and "[w]ithout misrepresentation or
nondisclosure, § 14(e) has not been violated." Id. at 12 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994)).
72. See United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d. 75,85 (2d Cir. 1990) ("As ageneral matter,
principles developed under rule lOb-5 are applicable in determining whether section 14(e)
violation's have been committed."), vacated in part en banc, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991);
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that
Section 14(e) and Rule lob-5 prohibit similar activity (citing Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir. 1973))); Hill, supra note 11, at 544 (discussing
parallels in language of Section 14(e) and Rule 1Ob-5); Martin, supra note 11, at 674 (stating
that purpose of Section 10(b) is to prohibit "manipulation or deception in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities" while the purpose of Section 14(e) is to prohibit "manipulation
or deception or fraud in connection with a tender offer").
73. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 625-27 (8th Cir. 1996) (looking to
Schreiber and Chiarella as authority for interpreting language of Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3),
rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997); Chestman, 947 F.2d at 585-87 (Mahoney, J., dissenting) (same).
74. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 560 (stating that "Section 1 O(b) is ageneral antifraud statute,
while Section 14(e) is an antifraud provision specifically tailored to the field of tender offers, an
INVALIDITY OF RULE 14e-3 'S DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 213
is clear, but the legislative history of Section 10(b) is somewhat ambiguous."
Furthermore, Congress may have modeled Section 14(e) on Section 15(c)(2)76
of the Act, rather than after Section 10(b)." Finally, some courts have found
that the SEC resolved to restrict Rule 1 Ob-5 to common-law fraud, but in-
tended Rule 14e-3 to apply to conduct beyond that limitation.7" These argu-
ments question the persuasiveness of Chiarella79 and Schreiber0 as precedent
for challenging the SEC's authority to promulgate Rule 14e-3.
B. Circuit Court Cases Upholding SEC's Promulgation of Rule 14e-3
1. The Second Circuit: United States v. Chestman
In UnitedStates v. Chestman,8' the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, found
that the SEC's promulgation of Rule 14e-3 was within the statutory authority
granted in Section 14(e). 2 A jury in the United States District Court for
area of the securities industry that, the Williams Actmakes clear, deserves special regulation.").
75. See id. at 561 (citing Chiarella for proposition that legislative history offers no
guidance for interpreting Section 10(b) while language of Section 14(e) reflects definite dele-
gation of power from Congress to SEC to regulate tender offer fraud); Loewenstein, supra note
65, at 1356 (stating that Section 14(e) commands SEC to promulgate rules that define and
prevent fraud while Section 10(b) does not include such power to define manipulative or decep-
tive acts or to prevent fraud).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2)(D) (1994). In describing the SEC's rulemaking power relating
to actions by securities dealers and brokers, Section 15(c)(2) of the Act states:
The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph, by rules and regulations
define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices
as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative and such quotations as are fictitious.
l
77. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 561 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (asserting
that rulemaking provision of Section 14(e) "mirrors" Section 15(c)(2) and not Section 10(b));
H.R. REP. No. 91-1655, at 4 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5025, 5028 ("The lan-
guage of the addition to Section 14(e) is identical to that contained in Section 15(c)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act concerning practices of brokers and dealers in securities transactions
in the over-the-counter markets.").
78. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 561-62 (asserting that although nothing in language, SEC
discussions, or administrative interpretations of Rule lOb-5 ever alluded to application beyond
common law fraud, language of Rule 14e-3 shows SEC intent for application beyond common
law meaning); SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 1992) (arguing that particular
characteristics of tender offer situations necessitated that SEC "ease the evidentiary burden by
eliminating the need to prove breach of fiduciary duty" with Rule 14e-3).
79. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 560-62 (describing limits on Chiarella's value as prece-
dent for Section 14(e) analysis).
80. See id. at 562-63 (highlighting differences between Section 14(e) and Section 10(b)
discussed in Schreiber).
81. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
82. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 563 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane) (holding
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the Southern District of New York had found Robert Chestman, a stock-
broker, guilty often counts of violating Rule 14e-3(a), ten counts of violating
Rule 1Ob-5, ten counts of mail fraud, and one count of perjury.83 These
charges stemmed from Chestman's trading in Waldbaum, Inc. (Waldbaum)
stock immediately before Ira Waldbaum, president and controlling share-
holder of Waldbaum, agreed to sell the company to the Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Company (A&P).84
Chestman appealed his convictions, claiming that Rule 14e-3 was invalid
because the SEC exceeded its rulemaking authority when it dispensed
with one of the common-law elements of fraud in nondisclosure cases -
breach of fiduciary duty." In three separate opinions by Judges Miner, 6
that Rule 14e-3(a) is within SEC regulatory power). The court based its holding on the plain
language of Section 14(e) and congressional intent. Id.
83. Id at 556; see also United States v. Chestman, 704 F.Supp. 451,454-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (denying Chestman's motion to dismiss indictments for Rule 14e-3 violations due to
SEC's invalid exercise of rulemaking authority in promulgating Rule 14e-3), revd, 903 F.2d
75 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated in part en banc, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
84. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 555-56 (summarizing facts of case). On November 21,
1986, Ira Waldbaum agreed to tender a controlling block of Waldbaum stock to A&P at a price
of $50 per share. Id. at 555. Waldbaum was a publicly traded company that owned a large
supermarket chain. Id. On November 23, Ira told his three children; his nephew; and his sister,
Shirley Witkin, about the impending sale. Id. On November 24, despite a warning from Ira not
to discuss the sale with anyone, Shirley told her daughter, Susan Loeb, about the sale of the
company. Id. The next day, Susan told her husband, Keith Loeb, about the tender offer and
admonished him not to tell anyone about the sale. Id.
On November 26, in spite of his wife's warnings, Keith contacted Chestman, his
stockbroker for the previous four years. Id. Chestman was aware that Keith's wife was the
granddaughter of Julia Waldbaum, a member of the Waldbaum board of directors, the wife of
its founder, and the mother of the company's president. Id Keith spoke with Chestman
between 9:00 A.M. and 10:30 A.M. and suggested to him that Ira was prepared to accept a
tender offer for Waldbaum stock at a price well above its market value. Id. During the course
of the morning and early afternoon, Chestman purchased 3000 shares of Waldbaum at $24.65
for his own account and 8000 shares at prices between $25.75 and $26.00 per share for his
clients' discretionary accounts, one of which belonged to Keith Loeb. Id. Later in the
afternoon, Keith called Chestman again, and Chestman told him that Waldbaum was a "buy"
stock based on his research. Id. Keith then had Chestman purchase 1000 shares on Keith's
behalf. Id. The tender offer for Waldbaum was publicly announced after the market closed on
November 26. Id. During the next business day, the price of Waldbaum stock rose to $49 per
share. Id.
85. See United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting Chestman's
argument that "his conviction under rule 14e-3 was improper because the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) exceeded its rulemaking authority in promulgating the rule"),
vacated in part en banc, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
86. See id. at 76-84 (providing Judge Miner's opinion). In determining that Rule 14e-3
was valid, Judge Miner distinguished the SEC's Section 14(e) rulemaking power from its
Section 10(b) authority by noting Congress's explicit intent in Section 14(e) to assure dis-
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Mahoney,17 and Carman," a Second Circuit panel reversed Chestman's
closure in tender offer situations. Rd2 at 83. Accordingly, he believed that Chestman's reliance
on the Section 10(b) decisions in Chiarella and Schreiber was misguided. d (citing Schreiber
v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). Judge Miner reasoned that Congress's desire to
protect tender offer investors validates the "disclose or abstain" rule provision of Rule 14e-3
even in the absence of a fiduciary duty. Id. Judge Miner determined that Congress approved
the SEC's promulgation of the Rule when it enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
(ITSA), providing treble damages for Rule 14e-3 violations. Id. at 83-84 (citing H.R. REP. No.
98-355, at 13 n.20 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2286 n. 20).
Judge Miner also found that application of Rule 14e-3 to traders who knew or had reason
to know that their information was material and derived from an insider was consistent with
Section 14(e)'s broad mandate to proscribe means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent
acts. See id at 83-84 (emphasizing SEC's broad power under Section 14(e) and Congress's
desire to protect investors).
87. See id 84-86 (Mahoney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (providing
Judge Mahoney's opinion). Judge Mahoney looked to the specific language of Section 14(e)
and Rule 14e-3 to find that the SEC exceeded its rulemaking authority. See id. (Mahoney, J.,
dissenting) (analyzing language of Section 14(e) to determine if Rule 14e-3 falls within scope
of SEC's power). Judge Mahoney determined that the language did not permit the SEC to
redefine the meaning of fraud, deceit, or manipulation in a manner inconsistent with Supreme
Court rulings concerning Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Id. 85-86 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
He found that the court should apply Rule 1Ob-5 principles, such as those found in Chiarella,
to its interpretation of Section 14(e)'s delegation of power. Id. at 85 (Mahoney, J., dissenting)
(citing Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1987)). In
addressing the language of Section 14(e), Judge Mahoney determined that the statute
"authorizes the Commission to prescribe rules which will 'define... such acts and practices as
are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative' in the tender offer context" but does not authorize
"the Commission to redefine the meaning of the terms 'fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative'
as established by authoritative Supreme Court interpretations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5,
upon which section 14(e) is concededly modeled." Id. at 85-86 (Mahoney, J., dissenting)
(citing Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 104 n.10 (1985)). Finally, he discounted
Judge Miner's contention that Congress approved the promulgation of Rule 14e-3 in its
discussion of ITSA, arguing instead that congressional references to the Rule were casual, that
they explicitly refused to discuss the substantive law of trading, and that they did not amount
to an approval of the SEC's rulemaking. Id. at 86 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 86-88 (Carman, J.,concurring) (providing Judge Carman's opinion). Judge
Carman reasoned that Rule 14e-3 was valid as long as any conviction for nondisclosure under
the Rule was contingent upon a showing of the elements of fraud: scienter and breach of duty.
Id. at 86-87 (Carman, J., concurring). He asserted that "there should be no conviction of a
crime under rule 14e-3 unless there has been separate substantive proof offraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative acts." Id. at 86 (Carman, J., concurring). He argued that Congress did not
grant the SEC the power to redefine fraud; therefore, the courts must apply the accepted
principles and elements of fraud to Rule 14e-3 cases. Id. at 87 (Carman, J., concurring).
Breach of duty is an element of fraud in nondisclosure cases. d at 88 (Carman, J., concurring)
(citing United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)).
If a Rule 14e-3 violation did not require a showing of the elements of fraud, Judge
Carman agreed with Judge Mahoney that the SEC exceeded its authority when it promulgated
the Rule. Id. at 87 (Carman, J., concurring). Judge Carman stated that if a Rule 14e-3 violation
215
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 199 (1998)
Rule 14e-3 convictions, as well as his convictions for the Rule 1Ob-5 viola-
tions, mail fraud, and perjury." In so doing, a division arose on the Second
Circuit panel as to the validity of Rule 14e-3, but a majority determined that
a breach of duty was necessary for a nondisclosure violation."
Sitting en banc, the Second Circuit vacated the panel's decision and
affirmed Chestman's Rule 14e-3 convictions.9 Writing an opinion joined by
four other judges, Judge Meskill determined that the SEC's promulgation of
Rule 14e-3 was well within the broad delegation of power that Congress
granted the agency in Section 14(e).92 He reasoned that the language of
Section 14(e) affords the SEC the power to define fraud for tender offer
situations. 3 Judge Meskill found that if the court limited the SEC to the
common-law definition of fraud, then the delegation of rulemaking power in
Section 14(e) would be a "hollow gesture."94 In addition, Judge Meskill
asserted that Rule 14e-3 was valid under the SEC's Section 14(e) delegation
of power to "prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent"'95 fraud because
such authority "necessarily encompasses the power to proscribe conduct
outside the purview of fraud, be it common law or SEC-defined fraud."96
Furthermore, Judge Meskill determined thatthe legislativehistory ofSec-
tion 14(e)upholdsthisbroad interpretationofthe SEC's authority.97 He also con-
cluded that congressional silence on the issue and the references to Rule 14e-3
in the legislative histories of the Insider Trading Sanction Act of 198498
could occur without a showing of the elements of fraud, then Judge Mahoney was correct and
the Rule is invalid. Id. (Carman, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 76-77.
90. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Miner's conclusion
that Rule 14e-3 was valid as written, Judge Mahoney's opinion that Rule 14e-3 was invalid
underauthority granted in Section 14(e), and Judge Carman's finding that Rule 14e-3 was valid
as long as it required showing of scienter and breach of fiduciary duty).
91. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
92. Id. at 558-59.
93. See id. at 558 ("It is difficult to see how the power to 'define' fraud could mean
anything less than the power to 'set forth the meaning of fraud in the tender offer context."
(quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW ITEmRNATiONAL DICTIONARY 592 (1971))).
94. Id. Judge Meskill warned that "[u]nder Chestman's construction of the statute, the
separate grant of rulemaking power would be rendered superfluous because the SEC could
never define as fraud anything not already prohibited by the self-operative provision." Id.
95. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994)).
96. Id.
97. See id. at 559 (determining that legislative history of Section 14(e) demonstrates
Congress's intent to delegate broad rulemaking power to SEC).
98. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat 1264
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). In its consideration of the ITSA, the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce (House Committee) noted that the SEC promul-
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(ITSA) and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act of 1988"9 (ITSFEA)
supported the Rule's validity."° Finally, he distinguished Chiarella and
Schreiber as precedents for evaluating Rule 14e-3 cases.'' Judge Winter, also
writing for four other judges, concurred with Judge Meskill and affirmed
Chestman's Rule 14e-3 convictions by reasoning that a person who received
information from a source enumerated in the Rule0 2 should know that the
source breached a duty by supplying the information. 3
gated "Rule 14e-3, which prohibits certain persons who learn of an impending, but as yet
undisclosed, tender offer from trading while in possession of that information," based on the
"broad antifraud remedy under section 14(e), which authorizes the Commission to promulgate
rules and regulations to proscribe fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative acts in connection
with any tender offer." H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 4 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2274, 2277. Later in the report, the House Committee discussed its intention for the SEC
to use its rulemaking authority under the ITSA to promulgate a rule similar to Rule 14e-3:
"Rule 14e-3 recognizes that it is inappropriate to hold a firm responsible in a situation in which
an effective process is in place to prevent passage to a firm's trading desk of material nonpublic
information known by others in the firm." Id. at 11, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,
2284. Finally, the House Committee cited Rule 14e-3 in a footnote in the report for the pro-
position that " [r]ecent action by the Commission and the courts has clarified the legal principles
governing the smaller number of cases that involve trading on information that originates from
sources other than the company - for example, information about a future tender offer." Id. at
13 n.20, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2286 n.20.
99. InsiderTrading and SecuritiesFraudEnforcementAct of 1988 (ITSFEA), Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). In its report
on the ITSFEA, the House Committee found that Rule 14e-3 has motivated many firms to
implement procedures "to detect insider trading and other market abuses by their employees,
and control the flow of information within a firm to prevent the misuse of such information."
H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6051.
100. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 560 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
101. Id. at 560-63. Judge Meskill determined that Chiarella lacked value as precedent for
interpreting Section 14(e) because: (1) it concerned Section 10(b), not Section 14(e) and (2)
the congressional intent underlying Section 14(e) is clear, while the congressional intentbehind
Section 10(b) is not. Id. at 560-61. Judge Meskill also concluded that the Schreiber Court's
analysis of the similarities and differences between Section 14(e) and Section 10(b) did not
support the contention that the scope of Section 14(e) should be the same as that of
Section 10(b). Id at 562. Judge Meskill noted that "[tlhe [Schreiber] Court was not confronted
with the question raised here - whether SEC action pursuant to the rulemaking delegation
exceeds statutory authority- because the petitioner did not point to any SEC rules drafted under
Section 14(e) that covered Burlington's activities." Id at 563. Similarly, he asserted that the
plaintiff's definition of "manipulative" in Schreiber was inconsistent with the intent of Congress
under Section 14(e), while Rule 14e-3 complied with the objectives of Section 14(e). Id.
102. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1997) (listing prohibited sources of information for
purposes of Rule as "(1) The offering person, (2) The issuer.., or (3) Any officer, director,
partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer").
103. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 581 (Winter, J., concurring) (imputing breach of duty
responsibility to parties who knowingly receive information from persons who have duty not
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Judge Mahoney, however, continued to assert that Rule 14e-3 was
invalid." 4 He determined that "the plain meaning of the dispositive language
[of Section 14(e)] is that the SEC is empowered to identify and regulate, in
this (then) novel context, the 'acts and practices' that fit within the existing
legal categories of the 'fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative,' but not to
redefine the categories themselves.""05 Furthermore, Judge Mahoney found
the other judges' reliance on the legislative history of Section 14(e) and the
references to Rule 14e-3 in the ITSA and the ITSFEA congressional hearings
unpersuasive because the history and references wire inconclusive and
offered little substantive support for the validity of Rule 14e-3.° 6 Finally, he
defended the applicability of Chiarella and Schreiber as persuasive precedents
for interpreting Section 14(e) and for finding that the SEC exceeded its
rulemaking authority. 7
2. The Tenth Circuit: SEC v. Peters
In 1992, the Tenth Circuit held in SECv. Peters' that Rule 14e-3 is con-
sistent with its enabling statute and true to Congress's intent in enacting Sec-
tion 14(e). °9 The SEC brought a civil action against Don Peters, a financial
to disclose). Judge Winter reasoned that although Rule 14e-3 does not require a breach of duty
specifically, all sources of information mentioned in the Rule have a duty under state law not
to reveal nonpublic, material information regarding tender offers. Id. (Winter, J., concurring).
Thus, "[o]ne who receives such information knowing the source can be held to know of a
breach of duty." Id. (Winter, J., concurring).
104. See id. at 588 (Mahoney, J., dissenting) ("In promulgating rule 14e-3(a), the SEC has
once again, in my view, acted in excess of its statutory authority.").
105. Id. at 584 (Mahoney, J., dissenting) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994)). Judge
Mahoney stated that the court should apply the accepted legal definition of the term "fraud" to
Section 14(e) rather than allowing the SEC to redefine fraud. Id. (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 584-85 (Mahoney, J., dissenting). Judge Mahoney also found that the cases
cited by the majority in support of Rule 14e-3 were easily distinguished from Chestman. Id.
at 585-86 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 586-87 (Mahoney, J., dissenting). Judge Mahoney believed that Chiarella's
discussion of common law fraud was apersuasive precedent in analyzing Section 14(e) because
Section 10(b) and Section 14(e) were related. Id. (Mahoney, J., dissenting). He discounted the
importance of the differences in language between Section 14(e) and Section 10(b). Id. at 587
(Mahoney, J., dissenting). Likewise, he found the Chiarella Court's failure to disapprove of
the application of the then-proposed Rule 14e-3 to warehousing of target stock to be
inconclusive because "[s]uch a disapproval would have been wholly gratuitous in the
circumstances." Id. (Mahoney, J., dissenting). Similarly, he found Schreiber persuasive due
to its assertion that Section 14(e) was modeled after Section 10(b) and its rejection of the
argument that Section 14(e) allows the SEC to change the definition of "manipulative." Id.
(Mahoney, J., dissenting).
108. 978 F.2d 1162(10th Cir. 1992).
109. See SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that Rule 14e-3 is
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planner, for insider trading in violation of Section 10(b), Rule lOb-5, and
Rule 14e-3. 1 ° At trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, a
jury found for Peters on each complaint asserted in the SEC's suit."' On
appeal, the SEC argued that the court incorrectly instructed the jury that in
orderto find Peters liable forviolatingRule 14e-3, itmustfindthat "the defend-
ant's action... constituted a violation of the relationship of trust and confi-
dence" that he held with his partner."' The SEC maintained that liability for
a nondisclosure violation of Rule 14e-3 does not require a breach of a fiduci-
ary duty and that the trial court'sjury instruction to the contrary was in error."3
Judge Ebel, writing for the court, sought to determine what Congress
intended by its use of "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" in drafting
Section 14(e) and what limits this language placed on the SEC's rulemaking
power.' 4 Judge Ebel, citing Judge Meskill's opinion in Chestman, opined that
the SEC "reasonably designed" Rule 14e-3 to achieve the Section 14(e) obje6-
tive of preventing fraudulentnondisclosure in tender offer situations by "easing
the evidentiary burden" while not altering the meanings of the terms "fraudu-
lent," "deceptive," and "manipulative.""' He noted that a significant number
of people may have access to confidential information relating to a specific
tender offer and some of those people might lack loyalty to the issuer and fail
"consistent with its statutory mandate and with the policy Congress sought to implement").
Don Peters and Ivan West were partners in Investment Management Group (IMG), a financial
management firm. Id. In addition to his work for IMG, West provided consulting services for
Energy Resources Group, Inc. (ERG) that included assisting in ERG's search for an investor
willing to make a friendly tender offer for ERG's stock. Id. Eventually, West's efforts helped
ERG negotiate a deal with Broken Hill Proprietary Company (Broken Hill) in which Broken
Hill agreed to make a tender offer for ERG's stock. Id.
When Broken Hill made its tender offerfortheERG shares, the SEC identified suspicious
trading activities involving the stock. See id. (noting SEC investigation of investors who bought
large amounts ofERG stock shortly before tender offer announcement and sold stock soon after
announcement at large profit). Shortly before the announcement of Broken Hill's tender offer,
several private parties purchased ERG stock that they sold at a substantial profit immediately
after the public disclosure of the agreement. Id. The SEC contended that Peters gave these
investors information about the tender offer before it was made public. Id. According to the
SEC, Peters, without West's knowledge, viewed documents relating to Broken Hill's tender
offer that West kept in his office at IMG. Id. The SEC alleged that Peters gathered information
about the tender offer from the documents and shared it with Ken Mick, a stockbroker, and
Bernard Lounsbury, one of Peters's former clients. Id. The SEC contended that Mick and
Lounsberry used this information to reap substantial gains by trading in ERG stock. Id.
110. Id. at 1164.
111. Id. at 1164-65.
112. Id. at 1165 (quoting jury instructions).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1166.
115. Id. (citing United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane)).
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to resist the temptation to profit on that information."6 Thus, it can be diffi-
cult to prove that an investor traded on information gathered through a breach
of a fiduciary duty even though circumstantial evidence of such an act may be
readily available." 7 To address this problem, Judge Ebel determined, Con-
gress granted the SEC broad prophylactic power that the SEC used to promul-
gate Rule 14e-3.1" He found further support for the validity of Rule 14e-3
in Congress's approval of "the rules and regulations of the SEC under the
Securities and [sic] Exchange Act of 1934 governing trading while in posses-
sion of material nonpublic information"'19 in the official findings included in
ITSFEA' z Judges Moore and Alley joined Judge Ebel in reversing the trial
court's finding for Peters and remanding the case for a new trial.''
3. The Seventh Circuit: SEC v. Maio
In SEC v. Maio," the Seventh Circuit held that Rule 14e-3 is "clearly
within the SEC's grant of authority."'" After an extensive bench trial in the
116. Id. at 1167.
117. See id. (stating that "it may be possible to prove circumstantially that a person was
knowingly trading on inside information, but almost impossible to prove that the trader
obtained such information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed either by the trader or by the
ultimate insider source of the information").
118. Id. Judge Ebel believed that Rule 14e-3 is consistent with the SEC's broad
Section 14(e) power to proscribe prophylactic measures. Id. He determined that the Rule is
"'reasonably designed' to prevent fraudulent trading on insider information by prohibiting the
recipient of such insider information from trading on it when such person knows that the source
of the information could not trade on it." Id.
119. See id. (quoting Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
(ITSFEA), Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 2, 102 Stat. 4677, 4677 (codified as amended in scattered
sectionsofl5 U.S.C.)). Ebeladmitted: "Congress does not appear to have specifically debated
Rule 14e-3, but we presume that Congress was aware of Rule 14e-3 and its implications when
it made its finding." Id.
120. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) § 2. In the
findings contained in ITSFEA, Congress determined that:
(1) the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governing trading while in possession of
material, nonpublic information are, as required by such Act, necessary and
appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors;
(2) the Commission has, within the limits of accepted administrative and
judicial construction of such rules and regulations, enforced such rules and
regulations vigorously, effectively, and fairly....
Id.
121. SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1173 (10th Cir. 1992). Judge Alley concurred in the
majority's analysis of the Rule 14e-3 convictions, see id. at 1173 (Alley, J., concurring), but
dissented on other issues presented in the case involving the exclusion of evidence at trial. See
id. at 1173-77 (Alley, J., dissenting) (providing Judge Alley's opinion).
122. 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995).
123. SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995). Louis P. Ferrero met Michael Maio
INVALIDITY OF RULE 14e-3 'S DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 221
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, the court
found that Michael Maio's and Patricia Ladavac's sales of Anacomp, Inc.
stock and purchases of Xidex stock violated Section 10(b), Section 14(e),
Rule l0b-5, and Rule 14e-3." 4 On appeal, Ladavac and Maio argued that
Rule 14e-3 exceeded the power granted to the SEC in Section 14(e) because
through their mutual friend, Dr. Ronald Palamara. Id. at 627. Maio, Ferrero, and Palamara
became close friends. Id. Palamara was the founder of Anacomp, Inc., a large, publicly held
company specializing in information services. Id. Based partly on a recommendation by Maio,
Palamara chose Ferrero to succeed him as president of Anacomp. Id. As president of the
company, Ferrero was privy to nonpublic information regarding other companies with which
Anacomp interacted. See id. (describing example of type of information that Ferrero had access
to through his position). Ferrero would share this material nonpublic information with Maio,
who used it to invest in the stock market. Id.
In February 1988, Xidex, amicrofilm manufacturer experiencing a deteriorating financial
situation, contacted Anacomp about the possibility of having Anacomp acquire Xidex. Id. at
627-28. On June 2, 1988, after Xidex's financial condition had declined further, Xidex
President Bert Zaccaria discussed Anacomp's interest in the company with Ferrero and inquired
about a possible offering price for the Xidex stock. Id. at 628. Ferrero and Zaccaria agreed to
meet in Las Vegas on June 6 and 7, 1988, and the two men met at that time as planned to
discuss the purchase. Id.
Immediately after the meeting, Maio and his close friend, 'Patricia Ladavac, began to
acquire Xidex stock and sell Anacomp stock. Id. Such transactions are consistent with
knowledge of a tender offer because the stock of the target company in a tender offer usually
rises while the price of the offering company's stock drops or remains steady. See SEC v.
Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that usually when tender offer is announced,
price of target company rises and price of offeror falls or does not change). Meanwhile,
pursuant to the Las Vegas meeting, Anacomp and Xidex took steps to prepare for the purchase.
Maio, 51 F.3d at 628. On July 7, Ferrero flew to California for a confidential meeting with
Xidex regarding the acquisition agreement. Id. Immediately prior to and during this trip, Maio
and Ladavac made a number of trades in Anacomp and Xidex stock. Id. at 628-29. Maio and
Ladavac continued to trade in Xidex and Anacomp stock while Ferrero was in Indianapolis
attending the Anacomp board meeting at which the board considered the tender offer
agreement. Id. at 629.
Anacomp and Xidex announced Anacomp's tender offer to the public on July 12. Id.
Based on the terms of the offer, Xidex's stock rose 26% and Anacomp's fell 13% when the
markets opened. Id. Immediately after the announcement, Maio and Ladavac sold all of the
Xidex stock that they had accumulated. Id. In total, Maio purchased 80,000 shares of Xidex
for $527,000 and accumulated profits of $211,000. Id. He also sold 60,000 share ofAnacomp
and avoided $66,250 in losses. Id. Similarly, Ladavac bought 25,000 shares of Xidex for
$155,000 and accumulated profits of $78,750, while selling 16,000 shares ofAnacomp to avoid
losses of $15,750. Id.
At trial, Maio and Ladavac claimed that they traded based on information available to the
public. Id. The district court rejected this argument and found that Maio and Ladavac violated
Section 10(b), Section 14(e), Rule 1Ob-5, and Rule 14e-3. Id. at 629-30. The court also found
that Maio and Ladavac's purchase of Anacomp stock violated Section 17(a) of the Act. Id. at
630. Ferrero reached an agreement with the SEC in which he consented to an entry ofjudgment
against himself without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations and agreed to pay a penalty
exceeding $275,000. Id. at 629.
124. Id. at 629-30.
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it "created a duty to disclose material non-public information absent a fidu-
ciary duty between the parties to the transaction."'" Ladavac and Maio cited
Dirks, Chiarella, and Schreiber for the proposition that nondisclosure violates
the Act only if a fiduciary relationship between the parties to a transaction
creates a duty to disclose." '26 The SEC responded by claiming that Rule 14e-3
was valid because Section 14(e) grants the SEC the power to define fraud,
deceit, and manipulation, as well as to promulgate rules intended to prevent
fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive acts." 7
Judge Manion, writing for a unanimous panel, rejected Maio's and
Ladavac's argument. 2 He stated: "The power to define and prescribe means
'reasonably designed to prevent' fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, acts,
and practices must extend further than the mere proscription of acts and
practices that are in fact fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative; otherwise this
language is superfluous."' 29 Thus, the SEC has authority to regulate activities
that are not themselves fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative in an effort to
prevent the occurrence of acts which do fit into one of those categories. 3
Based on this reasoning, the panel affirmed the validity of Rule 14e-3 as a
legitimate exercise of SEC rulemaking power and upheld the convictions of
Maio and Ladavac for Rule 14e-3 violations.1
3'
C. Eighth Circuit Breaks Ranks: United States v. O'Hagan 32
In United States v. O'Hagan, the Eighth Circuit rejected the courts of
appeals decisions in Chestman, Peters, and Maio and held that "the SEC
exceeded its rulemaking authority by enacting Rule 14e-3(a) without includ-
ing a breach of a fiduciary duty."'3 Following an SEC investigation into his
125. Id. at 635.
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1997)).
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)). Judge Manion found persuasive the
Peters and Chestman reasoning upholding the validity of Rule 14e-3 as a permissible exercise
of SEC rulemaking power and did not find it necessary to reiterate that reasoning in the court's
opinion. Id. at 635 n.14.
130. Id. at 635.
131. Id.
132. Cf Leuba, supra note 42, at 1147 (describing as "breaking rank" Fourth Circuit's
rejection of application of misappropriation theory to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, despite
acceptance of theory by Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits).
133. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 624 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting explicitly split
in circuits), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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investments in the Pillsbury Company (Pillsbury),'34 a grand jury indicted
James O'Hagan, a lawyer, on twenty counts of mail fraud, three counts of
money laundering, seventeen counts of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 viola-
tions, and seventeen counts of Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 violations.' At
trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, a jury found
O'Hagan guilty on all fifty-seven counts. 36 On appeal, O'Hagan argued that
the SEC exceeded its rulemaking authority by redefining fraud in its promul-
gation of Rule 14e-3.137
134. Id. at 614. Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met) was a large diversified company
based in London, England, with an interest in purchasing the Minneapolis-based Pillsbury
Company (Pillsbury). Id. In July 1988, Grand Met hired the law firm of Dorsey & Witney in
Minneapolis to act as local counsel for its acquisition ofPillsbury. Id. O'Hagan was a partner
at Dorsey & Witney. Id. After retaining Dorsey & Witney, Grand Met worked throughout the
summer and early fall of 1988 to amass the capital necessary to buy Pillsbury. Id.
On August 18, 1988, O'Hagan purchased one hundred Pillsbury call options, all expiring
on September 17. Id. at 614 n.1. During the remainder of August and September, O'Hagan
purchased 2900 more Pillsbury call options with expiration dates of September 17, October22,
and November 19. See id. at 614 & n.2 (outlining O'Hagan's call option purchases). At the
end of September, O'Hagan held 2500 Pillsbury call options, as well as 5000 shares of Pillsbury
common stock that he had purchased on September 10. Id at 614.
On October 4, 1988, Grand Met announced to the public its tender offer for Pillsbury
stock. Id. Like most stock prices after the announcement of a tender offer, Pillsbury's stock
price rose from $39 per share to almost $60 per share. Id. Shortly after the announcement,
O'Hagan sold his call options on the Pillsbury stock and bought the shares at the lower option
price. Id. Likewise, he sold the 5000 shares of Pillsbury common stock that he bought prior
to the announcement. Id. In total, O'Hagan reaped profits of over $4,000,000 on these
transactions. Id.
135. Id. As a partner at Dorsey & Witney, O'Hagan owed a fiduciary duty to Grand Met
because Grand Met was the firm's client. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983)
(citing lawyer as example of outsider becoming fiduciary of shareholders of corporation due
to fact that lawyer "entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business
of the enterprise and [was] given access to information solely for corporate purposes"). Thus,
if O'Hagan had traded in Grand Met stock, he would have perpetrated classical insider trading.
See Leuba, supra note 42, at 1145-46 (describing classical insider trading violation as situation
in which corporate insider "obtains material confidential information because of her position
and then trades in the shares of the company without disclosing the information" because, in
so doing, she "breache[s] the fiduciary obligation owed to the shareholders"). However,
O'Hagan traded in Pillsbury stock and not Grand Met stock. See supra note 134 (outlining
O'Hagan's trades). Because he did not owe a duty to Pillsbury, O'Hagan's failure to disclose
the material nonpublic information was not actionable under classical insider trading theory.
See Leuba, supra note 42, at 1145-46 (describing classical insider trading as requiring breach
of duty). Thus, the Government turned to Rule 14e-3 and the misappropriation theory of
Rule IOb-5 to prosecute O'Hagan. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 615.
136. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 614.
137. Id. at 623-24. Summarizing O'Hagan's argument, the court stated that he "claims that
the SEC impermissibly redefined fraud in Rule 14e-3(a) by omitting the requirement that a
breach of a fiduciary duty must be shown because the term fraud under § 14(e) requires a
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The Eighth Circuit agreed with O'Hagan.138 Addressing the language of
the second sentence of Section 14(e), Judge Hansen, writing for the court,
determined that "the statute empowers the SEC to 'define' and 'prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent' 'acts and practices' which are 'fraudu-
lent."" 39 According to Judge Hansen, this language grants the SEC power to
identify acts that are fraudulent, but it does not give the SEC authority to
redefinetheterm "fraudulent."14o He rejected the Government's argumentthat,
because Section 14(e) is a broad delegation ofpower, the court should interpret
its language as providingthe SEC with the authority to define fraud.14' Rather,
he looked to the Supreme Court's holdings in Chiarella and Schreiber to
determine the applicable meaning of fraud.'42 Judge Hansen found that the
Schreiber Court's reliance on Section 10(b)'s application of the term "man-
ipulation" in a Section 14(e) case supportedthe proposition that Section 1 0(b)'s
definition of "fraud" should similarly apply to Section 14(e).'43 Thus, Judge
Hansen looked to the Chiarella Court's reliance on common-law principles -
specifically, that fraudulent nondisclosure in Section 10(b) cannot existabsent
a duty to speak- to determine the scope of Section 14(e).'" He reasoned that
"[r]eadingSchreiber and Chiarellatogether leads to the conclusion that'fraudu-
lent' under § 14(e) includes a breach of a fiduciary obligation." 1
45
breach of a fiduciary duty." Id.
138. See id. at 627 (holding that SEC exceeded its rulemaking authority and vacating
O'Hagan's convictions).
139. Id. at 624 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994)). Judge Hansen came to this
interpretation by "eliminating those words [in the second sentence of Section 14(e)] that have
no bearing to our inquiry." Id.
140. Id. (citing United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 584 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(Mahoney, J., dissenting)). Judge Hansen asserted that "the enabling provisions simply permit
the SEC to 'define' and 'prescribe' 'acts and practices' which meet § 14(e)'s meaning of
'fraudulent."' Id. at 624-25.
141. Id. at 624-26. Judge Hansen rejected the Government's argument that if the SEC is
unable to define fraud in Section 14(e), then the SEC lacks any substantial power under the
statute. Id. at 626. He observed that the SEC's ability to define acts and practices in the tender
offer context that satisfy the definition of fraudulent "remains a very powerful tool." Id.
Likewise, he asserted that the "discrepancies in language" and differences in "legislative
draftsmanship" between Section 10(b) and Section 14(e) were inconsequential. Id. at 626.
142. Id. at 625-26. To determine the applicable definition of"fraud," Judge Hansen first
turned to Black's Law Dictionary for guidance. Id. at 625. However, the definition in Black's
proved inconclusive because it gave some meanings that were consistent with the need for a
breach of a fiduciary duty and some that did not include such a requirement. Id. (citing
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990)).
143. Id. (citing Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7-8 & n.6 (1985)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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Likewise, Judge Hansen refuted the government's contention that "the
SEC may regulate conduct which is not fraudulent in order to prevent the
commission of a fraudulent act" by noting that such an usurpation of power
would disregard Congress's specific use of the word "fraud" in Sec-
tion 14(e).146 Judge Hansen addressed the issue of the deference usually given
to an administrative agency's interpretation of its enabling statute by referring
to cases in which courts had found that the SEC exceeded its rulemaking
authority.'47 Accordingly, the court vacated O'Hagan's convictions.'48
IV. The Supreme Court's Decision in O'Hagan
A. A FlawedAnalysis: The Majority Opinion in O'Hagan
In a seven-to-two decision, 4 9 the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit and affirmed the validity of Rule 14e-3 as a proper use of the SEC's
rulemaking authority. 5 Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Ginsburg
evaluated the Government's argument that its interpretation of Section 14(e)
empowers the SEC (1) to define fraudulent acts in the tender offer context,
and (2) to establish provisions to prevent fraudulent acts.' The Court chose
146. See id. at 627 (finding that "the SEC has broad regulatory powers in the field of
tender offers, but the statutory terms have a fixed meaning which the SEC cannot alter by way
of administrative rule"). Judge Hansen cited Schreiber, in which that Court reasoned that the
SEC has the "latitude to regulate nondeceptive activities as a 'reasonably designed' means of
preventing manipulative acts, without suggesting any change in the meaning of the term
'manipulative' itself," for the proposition that the SEC cannot change the meaning of the term
"fraud." Id. (quoting Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11 n. 11).
147. Id. (citing Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 694 n.11 (1980); IBT v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551, 556 n.20 (1979); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
148. Id. In dissent, Judge Fagg stated that the court should follow the other three circuit
courts and uphold the validity of Rule 14e-3. Id. at 628 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
149. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2204 (1997). Justice Ginsburg wrote the
opinion for the Court in which Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer
joined. Id. at 2204-20. Justice Scalia filed an opinion that dissented with the Court's ruling as
to Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, but concurred in the Court's findings as to Section 14(e) and
Rule 14e-3. Id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas
filed an opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquistj oined, that dissented with the Court's findings
with regard to Rule lOb-5 and Rule 14e-3. Id. at 2220-31 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
150. See id. at 2206 (finding that Rule 14e-3 falls under prophylactic power of Sec-
tion 14(e)).
151. See id. at 2216 (summarizing Government's response to Eighth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of Section 14(e)). The Government argued that the SEC's defining power would be a
virtual nullity if the SEC could not regulate beyond common law fraud. Id. The Government
also contended that Rule 14e-3 is an application of the SEC's prophylactic power that Sec-
tion 14(e) provides. See id. at 2217 (analyzing prophylactic power of Section 14(e)).
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not to address whether the SEC has the authority to redefine fraud and opted
instead to uphold Rule 14e-3 as a valid application of the SEC's prophylactic
power.'52 In so doing, the Court determined that the scope of a prophylactic
rule, by its nature, usually expands beyond the act that the designers of the
rule intended to prevent.5 3 The Court held "that under § 14(e), the [SEC] may
prohibit acts, not themselves fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b), if
the prohibition is 'reasonably designed to prevent... acts and practices [that]
are fraudulent.
'" 154
The Court then analyzed whether the "disclose-or-abstain" provision in
Rule 14e-3 is reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent activities. 5 5 After
noting the substantial deference that courts afford to an agency's interpreta-
tion of its enabling statute,'56 the Court evaluated whether the SEC's promul-
gation of Rule 1 4e-3 was arbitrary or capricious and thus invalid. 57 The Court
looked to the SEC's justifications for Rule 14e-3 - the elimination of unfair
disparities in information among market participants and the difficulty of
proving a breach of duty in tender offer fraud cases - to find that the SEC's
promulgation of Rule 14e-3 was not arbitrary or capricious. 5 Thus, the Court
determinedthatthe "disclose-or-abstain" requirementinRule 14e-3 "'is ameans
reasonably designed to prevent' fraudulent trading on material, nonpublic
152. See id. (finding that Rule 14e-3 "qualifies under § 14(e) as a 'means reasonably
designed to prevent' fraudulent trading on material, nonpublic information in the tender offer
context").
153. See id. ("A prophylactic measure, because its mission is to prevent, typically
encompasses more than the core activity prohibited.").
154. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994)).
155. Id. at2217-19.
156. See id. at 2217 (stating that SEC's judgment is due "more than mere deference or
weight" (quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977))).
157. See id. at 2217-18 (finding that Court must grant SEC's interpretation "controlling
weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute" (quoting Chev-
ron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984))).
158. See id. at 2218 (deciding that SEC's assessment of Section 14(e) is not arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to the statute). The Court analyzed the SEC'sjustification of Rule 14e-3
"as a means necessary and proper to assure the efficacy of Williams Act protections." Id.
Those protections, according to the SEC, were aimed at ensuring an equality of information,
in that individuals with nonpublic, material information would not be disrupting the market.
Id. (quoting SEC Rule 14e-3, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,412 (1980) (preamble to Rule)). Like-
wise, the Court evaluated the SEC's asserted purpose in promulgating Rule 14e-3 to address
the SEC's difficulty in proving a breach of a fiduciary duty with regard to securities fraud in
the tender offer context. Id. at 2219. Citing Peters for its discussion of the unique problems
arising in proving a breach of a fiduciary duty in situations in which a person trades based on
material, nonpublic information in the tender offer realm, the Court found the "disclose or
abstain" requirement of Rule 14e-3 to be a reasonable means of addressing those problems. Id.
at 2218-19 (citing United States v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 1992)).
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information in the tender offer context,"'59 and therefore is not in excess of the
prophylactic power that Congress granted to the SEC in Section 14(e). 6 °
B. Consideration of Post Hoc Rationalization: The Court's "New Test"
for Addressing the Validity ofAgency Action
The majority ignored a fundamental principle of administrative lawwhen
it declined to address the SEC's stated rationale for promulgating Rule 14e-3
and instead upheld the Rule on the basis of a post hoc justification. 6' In
reviewing agency action for compliance with its enabling statute, the Supreme
Court traditionally has concluded that courts must evaluate the action on the
basis the agency supplied and not on rationalizations from counsel or the
court itself.'62 On its face, Rule 14e-3 professes to be a product of the SEC's
asserted power to redefine fraud for application in the tender offer context. 63
Rule 14e-3 clearly outlines what "shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative act within the meaning of § 14(e)."'' " Yet, the majority failed
to address this justification and looked to the SEC's prophylactic argument
for validation of the rulemaking. 65 The Supreme Court never should have
addressed the SEC's claim thatRule 14e-3 was an assertion of its prophylactic
power because that was not the SEC's actual justification for its actions.'66
The Court should have looked only at the Government's defining power




160. See id. (ruling that Rule 14e-3 is valid exercise of SEC's power under § 14(e)).
161. See id. at 2228 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("We evaluate regulations not based on the
myriad of explanations that could have been given by the relevant agency, but on those
explanations and justifications that were, in fact, given.").
162. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43,
50 (1983) (finding that Court must look to rationale that agency itself provided for action and
not justifications that reviewing court or appellate counsel proposed).
163. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2228 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(stating that language of Rule purposes it to be exercise of definitional authority).
164. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting, on basis of its language, that Rule is
"redefinition of what 'constitute[s] a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice
within the meaning of§ 14(e)"' (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1997))).
165. See id. at 2216 (deciding not to address SEC's defining power argument in favor of
prophylactic justification).
166. See id. at 2228 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "we need give no deference to
the Commission's post hoc litigating justifications not reflected in the regulation").
167. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding assertion that Rule 14e-3 is exercise of
preventative authority to be nonsensical and contrary to language of Rule); Kurtz & Sleeper,
supra note 11, at 728 (stating that"the language of Rule 14e-3 does not even purportto regulate
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The majority stated that Rule 14e-3 is a product of the SEC's full
rulemaking authority;.68 thus, it "may be conceived and defended, alterna-
tively, as definitional or preventative."6 9 The fact that the Rule "may" be an
exertion of either power is irrelevant because the Court must only look to the
ground that the SEC itself provided for the action. 7 By basing its decision
on a justification that the agency did not supply, the Court has altered the
accepted test for review of agency action."" Instead, the Court applied a "new
test" in which an agency may provide alternate justifications for its actions
after the fact in an effort to rehabilitate its claim that it acted properly.72
Under the O'Hagan reasoning, a reviewing court may use any grounds it
wishes to validate agency action.
C. The Court's Misapplication of Its "New Test" in O'Hagan
Not only is the Court's "new test" in O'Hagan flawed, the Court's
application of the "new test" is also problematic. 3 In evaluating the SEC's
nondeceptive conduct").
168. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2218 n.19 ("Sensibly read, the rule is an exercise of the
Commission's full authority.").
169. Id.
170. See SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 87-88 (1943) (confining review to basis that
agency supplied for its action); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS 336 (2d ed. 1992) ("A court can review an agency action only on the basis of the
grounds stated by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper,.., the court must
reverse the agency action even if the action could be affirmed on a basis not stated by the
agency.").
171. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2223 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("It is a fundamental proposition of law that this Court 'may not supply a reasoned basis for the
agency's action that the agency itself has not given."' (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 50 (1983))).
172. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that Court does not give credit to post hoc
rationalizations from agencies (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50)).
173. See id at 2228 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting SEC's prophylactic argument on
its merits). On a separate point, Justice Thomas rejected Rule 14e-3 because it applies the
SEC's faulty construction of the requirement that the fraudulent acts which the prophylactic
measures attempt to prevent must be "in connection with" a tender offer. See id. at 2228-29
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that "misappropriation theory does not represent a coherent
interpretation of the statutory 'in connection with' requirement" (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1994))). Noting inconsistencies and lack of predictability in the Government's interpretation
of"in connection with" as it applies to Rule lob-5 and Section 10(b), Justice Thomas found that
interpretation equally problematic with regard to tender offers. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting ).
Justice Thomas stated that "the Commission has provided no coherent or consistent explanation
as to why [the fraud that the SEC's misappropriation theory proscribes] is 'in connection with'
a tender offer, and thus the Commission may not seek to prevent indirectly conduct which it
could not, under its current theory, prohibit directly." Id. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
228
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post hoe, preventive power grounds, the Court found that the SEC's broad
Section 14(e) authority to enact prophylactic measures to prevent fraudulent
acts necessarily encompasses the power to "prohibit acts, not themselves
fraudulent under the common law of § 10(b), if the prohibition is 'reasonably
designed' to prevent" fraud. 74 The Court determined that the SEC may
implement a disclose-or-abstain rule for tender offer nondisclosure situations
under the auspice of preventing fraudulent acts even though such regulated
activities are not themselves fraudulent. 75 The regulation of these non-
fraudulent acts, however, must be reasonably designed to prevent acts that are
fraudulent. 76
The SEC provided two rationales for eliminating the breach of fiduciary
duty requirement: the difficulty of proving a breach of duty and the integrity
of the markets.'77 With regard to the difficulty in proving a breach of duty in
these tender offer fraud cases, such concern is unjustified given the majority's
affirmation of the misappropriation theory.'7 8 In misappropriation cases,
Rule 14e-3 requires that the defendant "know or have reason to know" that the
bidder or an agent of the bidder was the source of his nonpublic, material
information.'79 The SEC's assertion fails because, upon determining the
source of the defendant's information, the SEC would have little trouble
proving that the source breached a duty. 0
174. Id. at2217 (holding that Section 14(e) encompasses broad prophylactic power). But
see Kurtz & Sleeper, supra note 11, at 728 (stating that "Rule 14e-3 cannot be justified on the
basis of the SEC's power to regulate nondeceptive conduct").
175. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2217 (stating that prophylactic power includes authority
beyond prohibition of core activity). Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that the
prophylactic measure in Section 14(e) enables the SEC to proscribe acts that are not themselves
fraudulent, but are designed to prevent fraudulent acts. See id. at 2228 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(determining that "§ 14(e) authorizes the Commission to prohibit non-fraudulent acts").
176. See id. at 2217 (holding that reasonable limits exist as to activities that SEC can
regulate under Rule 14e-3); see also id. at 2230 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that core acts
that SEC intends to prevent through Rule 14e-3 must be fraudulent within accepted definition
of that term).
177. See idat2229-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (presenting Government's and majority's
justifications for Rule 14e-3). The Court stated that Rule 14e-3 is "a means necessary and
proper to assure the efficacy of Williams Act protections." Id. at 2218.
178. See id at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("There being no particular difficulties in
proving a breach of duty in such circumstances, a rule removing the requirement of such a
breach cannot be said to be 'reasonably designed' to prevent underlying violations of the
misappropriation theory.").
179. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). JusticeThomas reasonedthatproving the breach of duty
would not be difficult because "it is the bidder itself that was defrauded in misappropriation
cases, and there is no reason to suspect that the victim of the fraud would be reluctant to provide
evidence against the perpetrator of the fraud." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). He noted further
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As for the market protection justification, the SEC asserted that it de-
signed Rule 14e-3 to address "unfair disparities in market information and
market disruption." ' ' As examples of disrupting market practices, the major-
ity noted the "stampede effect" that rumors from trading on material, non-
public information might cause, and the practice of "warehousing."'' First,
not all trading based on unfair disparities in market information are fraudulent
acts.' As the Court stated in Chiarella, "not every instance of financial
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity."'84 Likewise, the stampede effect
and warehousing do not involve a breach of a fiduciary duty, so a regulation
designed to prevent them would not be designed to prevent fraudulent acts. 5
Thus, the SEC's promulgation of Rule 14e-3 with these regulatory purposes
conflicts with the language of Section 14(e).' 86 The SEC designed Rule 14e-3
to prevent acts that are not fraud; therefore, it exceeded the authority that
Congress granted to the SEC in Section 14(e).'87
that "[e]ven where the information is obtained from an agent of the bidder, and the tippee
claims not to have known that the tipper violated a duty, there is still no justification for
Rule 14e-3(a)." Id. at 2229 n.12 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Either the tipper will say that he told
the tippee that he was breaching a duty, in which case the tippee is liable under the
misappropriation theory, or he will say that he falsely told the tippee that there was no breach,
in which case there is a question whether the tippee did anything wrong. Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). In the alternative, the SEC could eliminate the provision that the tippee know
about the breach. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 2218 (outlining justifications for Rule 14e-3) (quoting SEC Rule 14e-3, 45
Fed. Reg. 60,412 (1980)).
182. See id. at 2229-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (restating majority's analysis of disruptive
market practices). Warehousing is the practice of "a bidder intentionally tipping allies to buy
stock in advance of a bid announcement." Id. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
183. See id. at 2230 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (reasoning that not all unfair disparities in
market information are result of breach of fiduciary duty).
184. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
185. See United States v. O'Hagen, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2230 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas asserted that "[u]nfair disparities in market information, and the potential
'stampede effect' of leaks, do not necessarily involve a breach of any duty to anyone, and thus
are not proper objects for regulation in the name of 'fraud' under § 14(e)." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, warehousing does not involve a breach of duty because the tippees
are acting with the approval of the source of the material, nonpublic information. Id. (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
186. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding that "acts [do not] involve breaches of
fiduciary duties, hence a Rule designed to prevent them does not satisfy § 14(e)'s requirement
that the Commission's Rules promulgated under that section be 'reasonably designed to
prevent' acts and practices that 'are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative"').
187. See id. at 2229-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding that SEC impermissibly designed
Rule 14e-3 to prevent both fraudulent and nonfraudulent activities). Although the SEC may
proscribe nonfraudulent conduct as a reasonable means to prevent fraudulent acts, the SEC does
not have the power to design means intended to prevent nonfraudulent acts. Id. (Thomas, J.,
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V Analysis of Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 Under the
Traditional Framework
Instead of creating its "new test," the Court should have addressed the
validity of Rule 14e-3 on the basis that the SEC provided.8" Rule 14e-3 states
that the actions prescribed in the rule, namely the disclose-or-abstain provi-
sion, "shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice
within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act."'8 9 The SEC clearly asserted
its alleged powerto redefine the terms "fraudulent," "deceptive," and "manip-
ulative" in the tender offer context'O in a manner contrary to their accepted
meanings.19 Thus, in order to determine properly whether Rule 14e-3 is a
valid application of the SEC's Section 14(e) rulemaking authority, one must
address the definitional power argument under the Supreme Court's tradi-
tional two-step analysis. 92 First, in addressing congressional intent, the lan-
guage, legislativehistory, andpolicy objectives ofRule 14e-3 and Section 14(e)
are all inconsistent with the proposition that the SEC may permissibly apply
the disclose-or-abstain provision of Rule 14e-3 to individuals whose silence
would not breach a fiduciary duty.'93 Second, regarding the reasonableness
of the SEC's interpretation of its enabling statute, the promulgation of
Rule 14e-3 presents a situation in which the normal deference is not appropri-
ate. 94 Thus, the SEC's establishment of a parity-of-information rule through
Rule 14e-3 is inconsistent with Section 14(e). 9s
dissenting). Thus, because the SEC intended Rule 14e-3 to prevent acts that are not fraudulent,
it exceeded its rulemaking authority. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (describing principle of administrative law
that courts must evaluate agency action on grounds that agency supplied).
189. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1997).
190. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that Rule 14e-3
is result of SEC applying defining power); Kurtz & Sleeper, supra note 11, at 728 (same).
191. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2216-17 (1997) (summarizing Gov-
ernment's argument that SEC has power to define fraud in tender offer cases in manner that
expands beyond common-law fraud).
192. See supra notes 33-40 and accompany text (discussing two-pronged test in Chevron).
193. See infra notes 196-262 and accompanying text (arguing that disclose-or-abstain
requirement of Rule 14e-3 is contrary to congressional intent).
194. See infra notes 263-71 and accompanying text (asserting that SEC's interpretation
of Section 14(e) should receive limited deference).
195. See Kurtz& Sleeper, supra note 11, at 725 (asserting that Rule 14e-3 creates "parity-
of-information" rule). Rule 14e-3 creates the "parity -of-information" rule by:
defin[ing] 'fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative' as the purchase or sale of a
security by a person who holds material information about a tender offer that he
knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and has been acquired directly or
indirectly from the tender offeror, the target, or any person acting on their behalf,
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A. Congressional Intent
1. Language of Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 and the SEC's
"Defining" Power
As the Supreme Court has stated, "[a]scertainment of congressional
intent with respect to the standard of liability created by a particular section
of the [Securities] Acts must ... rest primarily on the language of that sec-
tion.'196 The language of Section 14(e) grants the SEC the power to "define,
and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices
as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." '197 To ascertain whether the
scope of the SEC's authority under Section 14(e) encompasses the power to
create a disclose-or-abstain rule, it is necessary to determine the applicable
definitions of the terms "manipulative," "deceptive," and "fraudulent."
In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,'98 the Supreme Court asserted that
the term "manipulative" "refers generally to practices, such as wash sales,
matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by
artificially affecting market activity."' 99 Due to the technical meaning of this
term in securities cases,"0 the SEC could not have promulgated Rule 14e-3's
unless the information and its source are publicly disclosed before the trade.
Id.
196. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976); see also Schreiber v.
BurlingtonN., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 5 (1985) (asserting thatwhen interpreting statute, "[tjhe starting
point is the language of the statute").
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
198. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
199. Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,476 (1977). In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court
addressed the scope of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 in a Delaware short-form merger
transaction in which the majority shareholder attempted to purchase the minority shareholder
interest. Id. at 464-65. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. (Santa Fe) controlled 95% of Kirby Lumber
Co.'s (Kirby) stock and wished to acquire the other 5%. Id. at 465. To accomplish this goal,
Santa Fe performed a Delaware short-form merger, which allows a corporation owning at least
90% of the stock of a subsidiary company to merge with the subsidiary upon approval by the
parent corporation's board and cash payment for the shares owned by minority stockholders.
Id. Santa Fe offered the minority shareholders $150 per share for their Kirby stock, but the
minority shareholders believed that the price was too low. Id. at 466-67. The minority
shareholders claimed that Santa Fe violated Rule lob-5 by attempting to freeze-out the
minority, by obtaining fraudulent appraisals of Kirby's value, and by engaging in a deceitful
scheme to mislead the minority. Id. at 467. The Supreme Court concluded that Santa Fe did
not violate Rule lob-5 because Santa Fe's transaction was neither deceptive nor manipulative.
Id. at 474. In reaching this conclusion, the Court determined that fraud in the Rule lob-5
context mandates a showing of deception or manipulation. Id. at 473-74. In its interpretation
of S~ction 10(b), the Court stated that "manipulative" meant "artificially affecting market
activity in order to mislead investors." Id. at 477.
200. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (finding that "manipulative" is "virtually a term
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disclose-or-abstain provision based on Section 14(e)'s grant of power to
proscribe "manipulative" acts because the Rule does not address activities
intended to mislead investors by controlling the price of securities.01 Corpo-
rate outsiders who trade in stocks based on nonpublic material information do
not control stock prices and thus do not engage in "manipulative" acts.
Likewise, Rule 14e-3's disclose-or-abstain provision does not fall within
Section 14(e)'s delegation of power to the SEC to prevent "deceptive" acts in
the tender offer market. The dictionary defines "deceptive" as "an attempt to




At common law, an affirmative misrepresentation or half-truth upon which a
person relies to his detriment or a nondisclosure in circumstances when the
parties have a fiduciary relation to one another can constitute an action of
deceit. 3 The Supreme Court has identified two requirements for deceit in
nondisclosure cases: an "omission" or "misstatement" and a breach of a
fiduciary duty.' Relying on these definitions of the term, the SEC's power
to prevent "deceptive" acts does not authorize it to proscribe nondisclosure in
the absence of a duty to reveal the information." 5 Thus, the SEC's power to
enact Rule 14e-3 without a breach of fiduciary duty requirement must lie with
its authority to regulate "fraudulent" activities.20 6
of art when used in connection with securities markets").
201. See Laura Ryan, Comment, Rule 14e-3s Disclose-or-Abstain Rule and Its Validity
Under Section 14(e), 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 449, 486 (1991) (stating that "[b]ecause the term
'manipulative' only refers to these very limited number and types of activities, the broad
proscription of Rule 14e-3(a) could not have been enacted pursuant to the SEC's power under
Section 14(e) to define manipulative practices"); see also Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199
(finding use of word "manipulative" "connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities").
202. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 584 (1993).
203. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at
736-39 (5th ed. 1984) (outlining situations in which representations and nondisclosure serve
as basis for common-law deceit). The elements of common law deceit are: (1) a false repre-
sentation of a fact, (2) made with scienter, (3) intended to cause reliance, (4) producing
justifiable reliance that (5) causes damages. See id. § 105, at 728 (stating elements of common-
law deceit).
204. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 474 (finding no Rule lob-5 violation because no
"misstatement" or "omission" even though .Court found breach of fiduciary duty). In a
nondisclosure case, because there is no communication, the misstatement prong cannot apply.
See WEBSTER'S THiRDNEwINTERNATIONALDICTIONARY 1536 (1993) (defining nondisclosure
as "a failure to reveal facts bearing upon a transaction").
205. See Ryan, supra note 201, at 487 (stating that "Congress likely intended the term
'deceptive' in section 14(e) to include misrepresentations and omissions in breach of a duty to
disclose[,] ... [but] it is probable that Congress used the term 'deceptive' in Section 14(e)
mainly to proscribe silence in breach of a duty to disclose").
206. See id. (arguing that "if rule 14e-3 is to be upheld as a valid exercise of the SEC's
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At common law, silence is a fraudulent act only when there is a duty to
speak.2"7 In defining fraud in nondisclosure cases, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the existence of a fiduciary duty to disclose is a necessary prereq-
uisite for liability.2 8 In Chiarella, the Court stated that "in accordance with
the common law rule,. .. '[t]he party charged with failing to disclose market
information must be under a duty to disclose it.""'2 9 Thus, the SEC's enact-
ment of Rule 14e-3 with its disclose-or-abstain provision for those not in a
position of trust fails to adhere to this definition.210 Instead, in interpreting the
enabling statute, the SEC disregarded the common-law meaning of the term
and created a duty where one did not previously exist.2 '
The defenders of Rule 14e-3 argue that courts should interpret the
language of Section 14(e) in a manner that does not limit the SEC to the
accepted definition of fraud.2" Rule 14e-3's supporters believe that if the
enabling act confines the SEC to the common-law meaning of fraud, then the
rulemaking provision in the second sentence of Section 14(e) would be
unnecessary because the SEC could not proscribe any activity not already
power to define 'fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative' acts or practices, the acts proscribed by
rule 14e-3 must be 'fraudulent' actions as Congress intended the term to mean under
section 14(e)").
207. See 37 AM. JuR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 145, at 198-99 (1968) ("Where there is no
obligation to speak, silence cannot be termed 'suppression,' and therefore is not a fraud.");
Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Misrepresentation -Part I, 37 MD. L. REV. 488, 523
(1978) ("It has often been said that there is no affirmative duty of disclosure between parties
dealing at arms length"); Kurtz& Sleeper, supra note 11, at 725 (noting that"[a]t common law,
as well as under securities law, liability for nondisclosure cases has been premised upon a duty
to disclose arising from a fiduciary relationship").
208. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,228 (1980) (stating that "one who fails
to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only
when he is under a duty to do so").
209. See id. at 229 (quoting Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d
275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975)).
210. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (reasoning that "identical
words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning" (quoting
Department of Revenue v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332,342 (1994))). The Supreme Court stated
that the Securities Act of 1933, "like every Act of Congress, should not be read as a series of
unrelated and isolated provisions." Id. Thus, the courts should give the term "fraud" the same
meaning for its application in both Section 14(e) and Section 10(b).
211. See Gruenbaum, supra note 11, at 353 (contending that " [b]y its adoption of the
disclose or abstain from trading rule, the Commission has created what otherwise would appear
to be a nonexistent duty in the context of tender offers").
212. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551,558 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (finding
that "[the] delegation of rulemaking responsibility becomes a hollow gesture if we cabin the
SEC's rulemaking authority, as Chestman urges we should, by common law definitions of
fraud").
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prohibited in the first sentence of the Section.2"3 Under this reasoning, the
SEC would hold the vast power to define fraud in tender offer cases as it
deems appropriate.2"'
In making this argument, supporters of Rule 14e-3 misread Section 14(e).
The rulemaking provision of Section 14(e) states that the SEC may define and
prescribe means to prevent "such acts and practices as are fraudulent.""2 ' The
"as are" wording of the statute limits the SEC to the accepted meaning of the
term and prevents the SEC from redefining it.2" 6 Section 14(e) allows the SEC
to elaborate and to tailor its regulations in the tender offer context,2 7 but the
agency's actions must be grounded in the prevailing notions of fraud.21
213. See SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 635 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that Rule 14e-3 is valid
under power granted in Section 14(e) because "[tihe power to define and prescribe means
'reasonably designed to prevent' fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, acts and practices must
extend further than the mere proscription of acts and practices that are in fact fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative; otherwise this language is superfluous"); Chestman, 947 F.2d at 558
(noting that by limiting fraud to its common law definition, "the separate grant of rulemaking
power would be rendered superfluous because the SEC could never define as fraud anything
not already prohibited by the self-operative provision"); Brief for the United States at 11,
United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997) (No. 96-842) ("The 'defining' power would
be a virtual nullity were the SEC not permitted to go beyond common fraud (which is
separately prohibited in the first [self-operative] sentence of Section 14(e))").
214. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 558 (finding that "[i]t is difficult to see how the power to
'define' fraud could mean anything less than the power to 'set forth the meaning of' fraud in
the tender offer context"). Only the arbitrary and capricious standard for agency action would
limit the SEC's power to define "fraud." See Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1994).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).
216. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2227 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that SEC lacks authority in Section 14(e) to redefine "fraud"). In Schreiber, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the 1970 amendment to the Williams Act gave the SEC "latitude
to regulate nondeceptive activities as a 'reasonably designed' means of preventing manipula-
tive acts, without suggesting any change in the meaning of the term 'manipulative' itself."
Schreiberv. BurlingtonN., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11 n.1 (1985). In light of this construction, there
is no reason to believe that the Court would allow the SEC to redefine fraud or deception if it
could not alter the meaning of manipulation. See United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75, 86
(2d Cir. 1990) (Mahoney, J., dissenting) (doubting that SEC had authority to redefine term
"fraudulent" after Court ruled in Schreiber that SEC could not change basic meaning of
"manipulative"), vacated in part en banc, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
217. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612,624 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that SEC may
define acts and practices that fall within legal definition of"fraudulent"), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997); Chestman, 947 F.2d at 584 (Mahoney, J., dissenting) (noting that SEC may define acts
and practices that fall within legal definition of fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative); Kurtz
& Sleeper, supra note 11, at 725 (same).
218. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at2228 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contendingthatRule 14e-3
must comply with Supreme Court precedents interpreting fraud); see also O'Hagan, 92 F.3d
at 619 (finding that SEC has broad power to regulate tender offer field, but it may not alter
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Although Section 14(e) grants the SEC broad authority to regulate tender offer
situations, the government's interpretation impermissibly expands the SEC's
authority.219 Such power runs contrary to Congress's use of specific terms in
its enabling statute"2 and the premise that Congress should not provide
administrative agencies with unrestrained authority to promulgate rules.22
fixed meaning of statutory terms to do so).
219. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 584 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(Mahoney, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]t is thus clearly unacceptable to conclude that
Chestman can be validly convicted of a felony violation of section 14(e) and rule 14e-3(a) for,
in the words of the majority, 'conduct outside the purview of fraud, be it common law or SEC-
defined fraud"'). According to Judge Mahoney, the term "fraudulent" in the second sentence
of Section 14(e) is irrelevant under the Government's reading since the statute would allow
the SEC to prosecute acts that were not fraud themselves. Id. (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
Judge Mahoney also determined that the SEC's broad authority to regulate a wide scope of
"acts and practices" novel to tender offer situations "rebuts the majority's view that unless
the 1970 amendment is deemed to authorize the SEC to engage in creative redefinitions of the
terms 'fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative,' the amendment will become a meaningless
repetition of the preexisting self-operative provisions of section 14(e)." Id. (Mahoney, J.,
dissenting).
220. See Chestman, 903 F.2d at 85-86 (Mahoney, J., dissenting) (stating that SEC power
outlined in Section 4(e) does not include power to redefine terms), vacated in part en banc, 947
F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). Judge Mahoney reasoned that:
Section 14(e)['s] authoriz[ation] [of] the Commission to prescribe rules which will
"define... such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative" in
the tender offer context.., seems directed at the application of these legal concepts
in a relatively novel area (especially in 1970, when Section 14(e) was amended to
add this language), rather than to constitute an authorization for the Commission
to redefine the meaning of the terms "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative" as
established by authoritative Supreme Court interpretations of Section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5, upon which Section 14(e) is conceitedly modeled.
Id. (Mahoney, J., dissenting); see also O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 624 (finding government's
conflation of"the language of the statute into a broad empowerment to the SEC to 'define' and
'prescribe' 'fraud"' to be misreading of plain language of Section 14(e)); A.L.A. Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 538-39 (1935) (prohibiting "sweeping delega-
tion[s] of legislative power" to agencies).
221. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2228 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that if Court
interpreted Section 14(e) in the manner in which SEC proposed, then statute "would seem to
offer no 'intelligible principle' to guide the agency's discretion and would thus raise very
serious delegation concerns, even under our current jurisprudence" (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr.
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))); see also Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasizing
prohibition on Congress's "uncanalized delegations of legislative power" to administrative
agencies); Aman & Mayton, supra note 26, at 30 (stating that delegations of legislative power
should include discemable standards because "statutory terms should not be so open-ended as
to leave an agency free to pick and choose among important social values"). If the SEC holds
the power to define the terms of its enabling statute (i.e., "fraud") or regulate activities not
included in the statute (i.e., acts that are not fraud but are regulated under prophylactic power),
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Because Rule 14e-3 prohibits any nondisclosure when trading on tender offers
rather than just fraudulent nondisclosure, Rule 14e-3 exceeds the authority
that Congress granted to the SEC in Section 14(e).22
2. Legislative History and Intent Behind Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3
"Reliance on legislative history in divining the intent of Congress is, as
has often been observed, a step to be taken cautiously."2 Although the
"legislative history specifically concerning § 14(e) is sparse, ' 224 Congress's
objective in enacting the Williams Act and delegating broad rulemaking
authority to the SEC was clearly to protect investors in tender offer situations
through a disclosure requirement.2 There is no intelligible indication, how-
ever, that Congress intended for the SEC to expand the definition of fraud 6
If Congress resolved to grant the SEC this extensive power, it seems likely
that Congress would have made some mention of it during the congressional
debates addressing the Section 14(e) rulemaking provision. There was no
such indication. Instead, the SEC stated that the 1970 Amendment did not
then courts will nothave standards to enforce, and Congress will lose constitutionally mandated
control of the agency. See J. W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409 (stating that as long as Congress
"lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized
to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power").
222. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2228 (1997) (Thomas, J.,dissenting)
("Rule 14e-3(a) does not prohibit merely trading in connection with fraudulent nondisclosure,
but rather it prohibits trading in connection with any nondisclosure, regardless of the presence
of a pre-existing duty to disclose .... [It] thus exceeds the scope of the Commission's
authority.").
223. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) (citing Department of Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 388-89 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)); United States v. Public
Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295,319 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); Scripps-Howard Radio
v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942)). But see Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1985) (looking to legislative history of Rule 14e-3 and Section 14(e) for guidance on
Congress's objectives after analyzing their language).
224. Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11.
225. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text (describing legislative history of
Williams Act and its amendments); see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 62, at 1895-96
(stating that it is mistake "to conclude that the specific, relatively narrow shareholder
protections that Congress provided [in the Williams Act] were part of some larger, well-
conceived, and theoretically coherent federal policy that defines investor 'protection' in terms
of an unlimited right of access to tender offer opportunities").
226. See Kurtz & Sleeper, supra note 11, at 726 (contending that "[w]hile it is undeniable
that Rule 14e-3 effectuates abroad objective of disclosure, the scant and indefinite statements
of legislative intent behind Section 14(e) do not clearly express that Congress intended to give
the SEC authority to give new meaning to the termU 'fraudulent"').
237
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expand the rulemaking authority contained in the original Williams Act. 7
Thus, because the Williams Act did not include a delegation of power that
could support the validity of the SEC's promulgation of Rule 14e-3, the SEC
may not interpret the 1970 rulemaking provision as authorization to create
such a rule.228
The legislative histories of ITSA"9 and ITSFEA230 do not sustain the
validity of Rule 14e-3 either 31 During its consideration of ITSA, the House
227. See Investor Protection in Corporate Takeovers: Hearings on H.R 4285, S. 3431,
andS. 336Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 4-6 (1970) (memorandum of the SEC) (outlining SEC's
opinions on 1970 amendment to Williams Act). The memo reads:
As it now exists, Section 14(e) prohibits false statements and fraudulent or
deceptive practices in connection with tender offers, but does not specifically grant
the Commission any rule-making authority to deal with such practices. Though
general authority contained in the Act could probably be relied on for this purpose,
[the proposed amendment to the Williams Act] would add a sentence granting to
the Commission rule-making power specifically to define and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent deceptive and manipulative practices in
this area.
Id. at 6.
228. See Kurtz & Sleeper, supra note 11, at 727 (noting SEC's assertion that its general
rulemaking authority could reach Section 14(e) areas). "The SEC's interpretation of
section 14(e) through Rule 14e-3, however, is a dramatic change to the SEC's rulemaking
authority and one that is in stark contrast to the impression conveyed to Congress." Id.
229. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
230. InsiderTrading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
231. See United States v. Chestnan, 947 F.2d 551, 559-60 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citing
ITSA enactment and ITSFEA passage as support for validity of Rule 14e-3). Further, in
Chestman, the government asserted that an SEC memorandum supports validity of Rule 14e-3.
See id. (citing SEC memorandum to support validity of Rule 14e-3). In the memo, the SEC
offered the example of a "person who has become aware that a tender bid is to be made, or has
reason to believe that such bid will be made, may fail to disclose material facts with respect
thereto to persons who sell to him securities for which the tender bid is to be made," as a
practice in tender offers that the SEC could prevent through the rulemaking power of
Section 14(e). Additional Consumer Protection in Corporate Takeovers and Increasing the
Securities Act Exemptions for Small Businessmen: Hearing on S. 336 and S. 3431 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 12 (1970)
(Division of Corporation Finance memorandum discussing situations that SEC's rulemaking
authority under 1970 amendment would address). Because this example does not mention the
need for a breach of a fiduciary duty, the Government argued that it supported the assertion that
Section 14(e) does not require such a breach. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 559 (noting that
SEC's "hypothetical does not contain any requirement that the trader breach a fiduciary duty").
It is improper, however, "to suggest that this rough outline of a regulatory 'problem area'
should be read to provide a precise delineation of the scope and purpose of the 1970
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Committee on Energy and Commerce (House Committee) rejected the propo-
sition that Congress should statutorily define insider trading because, among
other reasons, "the law with respect to insider trading is sufficiently well-
developed." 2 In support of this statement, the House Committee specifically
cited Rule 14e-3. 3  Similarly, the House Committee report concerning
ITSFEA noted that Rule 14e-3 prompted efforts by firms "to detect insider
trading and other market abuses by their employees" through self-imposed
insider trading detection procedures." Moreover, Congress presumably
approved Rule 14e-3 in its findings submitted in the ITSFEA." 5 Defenders
of the SEC's promulgation of the Rule reason that "[t]hese references
to Rule 14e-3 during debates on proposed insider trading legislation may not
amount to congressional ratification of Rule 14e-3, but they do support the
Rule's validity." 6
Nonetheless, courts should treat this post-adoption legislative history for
what it really is - a series of inconclusive comments of limited significance.
The casual references to Rule 14e-3 in the House reports and ITSFEA are not
evidence of a congressional intent to accept the Rule without a requirement
of a breach of a fiduciary duty. 7 With regard to the ITSA House report, the
amendment." Id. at 585 (Mahoney, J., dissenting). Rather, courts should view this example as
a "thumbnail sketch of a 'problem area,"' not as a specific grant of power that enables the SEC
to ignore the plain meaning of Section 14(e)'s language and to create a disclose-or-abstain rule.
See id. (Mahoney, J., dissenting) (reasoning that court should give SEC's example limited
weight when determining congressional intent).
232. H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 13 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2286.
233. Id. at 13 n.20, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2286 n.20.
234. H.R .REP. No. 100-910, at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6051.
235. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) § 2,
(noting SEC's rules and regulations underAct "governing trading while in possession ofmater-
ial, nonpublic information are, as required by such Act, necessary and appropriate in the public
interest and for the protection of investors"); see also SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1167 (10th
Cir. 1992) (stating that "[a]dmittedly, Congress does not appear to have specifically debated
Rule 14e-3 [with regard to ITSFEA], but we presume that Congress was aware of Rule 14e-3
and its implications when it made its finding").
236. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 560 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
237. See United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75, 86 (2d. Cir. 1990) (Mahoney, J., dissent-
ing) (describing limited significance of references to Rule 14e-3 in legislative histories ofITSA
and ITSFEA), vacated in part en bane, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). Judge Mahoney wrote:
In my view, the very casual references to rule 14e-3 in [the legislative histories of
ITSA and ITSFEA], provide no basis for concluding that later statutory enactments
have recognized not only the promulgation and existence of rule 14e-3, but also the
Commission's claim that rule 14e-3 effects an implied repeat of any fiduciary duty
requirement in the area of tender offer fraud.
Id. (Mahoney, J., dissenting).
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House Committee mentioned Rule 14e-3 in a footnote based on a SEC letter
in which the SEC fails to mention the Rule's significant alteration of insider
trading law." This context, as well as the House Committee's unequivocal
statement that ITSA "does not change the underlying substantive case law of
insider trading as reflected in judicial and administrative holdings," 9 sup-
ports the argument that by referring to Rule 14e-3 in the footnote, the House
Committee did not intend to approve the vast deviation from historical princi-
ples that the disclose-or-abstain rule entails.240
Similarly, the references to Rule 14e-3 in the ITSFEA legislative history
are of little significance in assessing the intent of Congress with respect to
Section 14(e). The House Committee report that mentions Rule 14e-3 also
"makes clear that [ITSFEA] does not address the substantive law of insider
trading.""24 Moreover, in a discussion of what constitutes insider trading, the
Committee report analyzed case law concerning Section 10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5.242 In this discussion, the report noted that liability is based on a
duty to disclose and that there is no general duty to disclose material
nonpublic information.243 Interestingly, the report cites Section 14(e) in the
discussion, but makes no reference to Rule 14e-3 and its disregard of the
breach of duty requirement.2
Based on this information, it seems inappropriate to assert that these
references amount to any significant evidence of Congress's support of
Rule 14e-3 and the SEC's interpretation of Section 14(e). 245 Courts cannot
238. See Kurtz & Sleeper, supra note 11, at 727 (claiming that footnote in House
Committee report was based on SEC letter that gave no indication of dramatic departure from
established insider trading law principles that Rule 14e-3 encompassed). The letter is reprinted
in the House Committee report. H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 27-33 (1983) (letter from SEC
Chairman John S.R. Shad), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2299-2306.
239. H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,2286.
240. See Kurtz & Sleeper, supra note 11, at 727 (claiming that "while Congress may have
been aware of Rule 14e-3, there is no indication that Congress was aware of its significance").
241. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 86 (Mahoney, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-910,
at 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044).
242. H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 7-11, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044-48.
243. Id. at 8-10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6045-47.
244. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6045;see Kurtz& Sleeper, supra note
11, at 725 (stating that "[i]t is interesting to note that although section 14(e) is cited, there is no
reference to Rule 14e-3 in this part of the report and the fact that it dispenses with the duty
requirement").
245. Cf Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 694 n. 11 (1980) (finding fact that Congress did not
overturn SEC's interpretation of statute when addressing different issues is not necessarily
support for that interpretation). The Court stated that:
since the legislative consideration... was addressed principally to matters other
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realistically read nebulous comments as expressing a discernable congressio-
nal intent to alter securities law in a manner as significant as that provided in
Rule 14e-3.2" A deviation from precedent and common law of this magni-
tude requires clear evidence of congressional intent, and this legislative
history does not supply such evidence.247
3. Policy Objectives of Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3
By enacting Section 14(e), Congress intended for the SEC to develop
rules that would protect investors in tender offer situations.24 The SEC
was to use its expertise to determine how people commit fraud in the tender
offer setting. 249 In promulgating the overinclusive disclose-or-abstain provi-
sion in Rule 14e-3, the SEC resolved to realize this investor-protection objec-
tive through two policies: parity of information among shareholders and
preservation of the integrity of the securities market (specifically the tender
offers market)." By creating a disclose-or-abstain rule, the SEC hoped to
prevent investors with access to nonpublic information from prospering at the
expense of other investors who do not have such information."1 Likewise, if
than that at issue here, it is our view that the failure of Congress to overturn the
Commission's interpretation falls far short of providing a basis to support a
construction of § 10(b) so clearly at odds with its plain meaning and legislative
history.
Id.
246. See Kurtz & Sleeper, supra note 11, at 726 (stating that "there must be clear evidence
of congressional intent to sustain a construction that is contrary to the language in section 14(e)
and the plain meaning of the terms 'fraudulent,' 'deceptive,' and 'manipulative"').
247. See id. at 730 (noting that "[s]uch a dramatic change should only be the result of clear
legislative intent" and concluding that "[tlhe legislative history falls far short in expressing this
intent").
248. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing investor protection as
congressional objective in enacting Section 14(e)).
249. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 626 (8th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that"even
without the power to define fraud, [Section 14(e)] remains a very powerful tool because the
SEC has broad latitude in regulating acts and practices in the wide ranging and diverse field of
tender offers"), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
250. See Gruenbaum, supra note 11, at 352-53 (stating that articulated impetus for
Rule 14e-3 was "that trading by persons in possession of material, nonpublic information
relating to a tender offer creates unfair disparities in information between shareholders, is
disruptive to the orderly functioning of the securities markets, and has a detrimental impact on
tender offer practice").
251. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV 322, 360 (1979) (noting that "the logic of the
disclose-or-refrain rule precludes exploitation of an informational advantage that the public is
unable lawfully to overcome or offset"); Heller, supra note 11, at 555 (asserting that "the SEC
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investors believe that the markets are full of investors possessing relevant
nonpublic information, they will lose confidence in the markets and refuse to
invest. 2 Rule 14e-3, however, fails to address adequately either policy
because the parity-of-information rule conflicts with Congress's approach to
federal securities regulation, and little evidence exists that the Rule would
have any impact on investors' perceptions of the markets.
As the Supreme Court stated in Chiarella, "[n]either the Congress nor the
Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-information rule."'1 3 Rather, "the
problems caused by misuse of market information have been addressed by
detailed and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of market
information may not harm operation of the securities markets.,,1 4 This
method of regulation is effective because it addresses the reality that investors
inevitably possess different information which they may acquire through any
number of avenues. 5 Further, it is illogical that in Section 14(e) Congress
would prohibit silence in certain personal transactions when such non-
disclosure would make prior statements misleading 6 and then would delegate
authority to the SEC to implement a universal equal-access-to-information
provision.5 Thus, Rule 14e-3's parity-of-information requirement is over-
inclusive and inconsistent with Congress's "detailed and sophisticated regula-
tion" practices."
is concerned with 'fairness' to investors, that is, the availability of all information equally to
all investors").
252. See Heller, supra note 11, at 555 (finding that "[t]he Commission's view has been,
at least prior to Chiarella, that security markets will have integrity, meaning the confidence of
investors, only if the investors perceive that all available information is as promptly as possible
made known to all security holders equally").
253. United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
254. Id The Court continued: "For example, the Williams Act limits but does not
completely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target corporation stock before public
announcement of the offer." Id.
255. See Kenneth E. Scott, insider Trading: Rule 1Ob-5, Disclosure and Corporate
Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 805 (1980) (noting that "[i]f pushed far enough.., it will
always be found that the parties are not on a parity in all regards; there will be disparities in
knowledge or intelligence or experience or capital or whatever").
256. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994) (stating that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person
to... omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading").
257. See Kurtz & Sleeper, supra note 11, at 729 (arguing that "[i]t seems illogical for
Congress to have qualified when silence is illegal in personal transactions and then grant the
SEC the power to promulgate a 'parity-of-information' rule").
258. See Gruenbaum, supra note 11, at 354 (contending that "a 'parity-of-information' rule
such as the new disclose or abstain from trading rule goes beyond the 'detailed and
sophisticated regulation' implemented by 'Congress' [sic] careful action' in enacting the
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Arguably, the disclose-or-abstain rule enhances market integrity because
the public will not want to participate in the market unless they believe that
they have access to material information equal to that of the other market
participants.u 9 However, "no empirical evidence exists that the presence of
unequal information among investors concerning securities discourages
investment.""26 Instead, a person's decision regarding whether or not to invest
usually depends on "prevailing economic business and market conditions,
earning trends of the company and other components of a rational analysis of
securities values."26' With regard to disparities in information, investors
participate in the markets by putting their money in the hands of those with
knowledge in order to take advantage of these information discrepancies.262
Therefore, a parity-of-information rule does little to affect the confidences of
investors as reflected in their investment practices.
Williams Act"); cf Leuba, supra note 42, at 1170 (noting that Supreme Court in Santa Fe
emphasized persuasiveness of limitations in language of Section 10(b) over concerns about
market fairness when it interpreted Rule 10b-5).
259. See Cook, supra note 11, at 206-07 (stating that "[t]his theory posits that if people
believe that the market is full of cheaters they will refrain from trading; it characterizes insider
trading as a deterrent to full public participation in the stock market" (citing Roy A. Schotland,
Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REv.
1425 (1967))).
260. Heller, supra note 11, at 556. Heller also asserts that "[i]t may well be doubted that
investors, in fact, readily perceive any unfairness in market transactions or doubt the markets'
integrity because of known differences in information available to investors." Id. at 555-56.
Heller cites a statement by the Commissioner of the SEC which claims that insider trading
constitutes "only a tiny fraction of 1 percent of the volume oftrading." Id. at 556 (alteration in
original) (quoting Kenneth B. Noble, S.E.C. ChiefPlans Inside Trade Curb, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 1981, at DI). The statement continues: [I]t's wrong to suggest that the public is playing
a game for which the dice is loaded against them." Id. (quoting Kenneth B. Noble, S.E.C. Chief
Plans Inside Trade Curb, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1981, at D1).
261. Id.
262. See Cook, supra note 11, at 207 (asserting that" [p]eople recognize that informational
discrepancies exist among traders and attempt to exploit these discrepancies by placing their
investments in the hands of individuals who have greater access to information" and proffering
statistic that institutions and brokerage firms account for more than 80% of New York Stock
Exchange volume (citing Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task
Force on Regulation ofInsider Trading, Part I: Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 223, 226 (1985))); see also L. Gordon
Crovitz, With "Insider Trading," It's Conviction First-Definition Later, WALL ST. J., May 9,
1990, at Al5 (stating that "[florced equality of information is an odd idea in an industry with
legions of analysts paid to ferret out information and where Moms and Pops pay mutual funds
to watch markets for them").
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B. Limits on Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Enabling Statutes
Although courts afford agencies significant deference in interpreting their
enabling statutes,263 the circumstances surrounding the promulgation of
Rule 14e-3 may limit the deference that courts should give to the SEC's
interpretation of Section 14(e). 2" First, such deference may not be appropri-
ate in situations in which an agency is interpreting limits on its own statutory
power such as is the case under Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3.26 Second,
some courts have found that Congress must provide clearer standards for an
agency when a congressional delegation of authority allows the agency to
promulgate regulations carrying criminal penalties.266 This need for specific
263. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) (outlining process for courts to follow when reviewing agency's construction
of its enabling statute). The Court stated that "[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of
statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,
that intention is the law and must be given effect." Id. at 843 n.9. Similarly, courts "must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." Id. However,
if the congressional intent behind the enactment of a statute is not clear, "considerable weight
should be accorded to an [agency's] construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer." Id. at 844.
264. See IBT v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 (1979) (discussing limits on agency's
interpretive role). The Court reasoned that:
This deference [due an agency] is a product both of an awareness of the practical
expertise which an agency normally develops, and of a willingness to accord some
measure of flexibility to such an agency as it encounters new and unforeseen
problems over time. But this deference is constrained by our obligation to honor
the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose, and history.
On a number of occasions in recent years this Court has found it necessary to reject
the SEC's interpretation of various provisions of the Securities Acts.
Id. at 566 n.20 (citing SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-19 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976); United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 n.25 (1975); Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 759 n.4 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Reliance Elec. Co. v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1972)).
265. See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 467 (questioning legitimacy of deference to agency's
interpretation of its own power); Braun, supra note 32, at 1002-07 (addressing potential for
agencies to accumulate power impermissibly through interpretation of own statute).
266. See Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160,165-66(1991) (discussing whether "some-
thing more than an 'intelligible principle' is required when Congress authorizes another Branch
[or agency] to promulgate regulations that contemplate criminal sanctions"). Compare Fahey
v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1947) (stating that "discretion to make regulations.., in
[Home Owners' Loan Act] matters may be constitutionally permissible while it might not be
allowable to authorize new crimes in uncharted fields") with United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S.
506, 518, 521 (1911) (stating that promulgation of rule that carries criminal punishment is not
"raised from an administrative to a legislative character because the violation thereof is
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guidance in the enabling statute from Congress is based on the "heightened
risk to individual liberty."267 Because a violation of Rule 14e-3 is a felony
punishable by up to ten years imprisonment and a $1,000,000 fine,26" simply
deferring to the agency interpretation may be inappropriate in this context.269
Third, to rebut the plain meaning doctrine of statutory interpretation, the SEC
must provide evidence of clear congressional intent to empower the SEC to
disregard the common meaning of "fraud" and interpret Section 14(e) in a
manner inconsistent with its language.27 Such evidence does not exist.27'
VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's ruling in O'Hagan is problematic. The Court
deviated from precedent by upholding Rule 14e-3 on the basis of a post hoc
rationalization. Under the Court's "new test" for determining the validity of
agency action, a reviewing court may now turn to any grounds it can find for
justification of an action. No longer does the validity of rulemaking rest on
the actual rationale that the agency provides for the action.
Furthermore, the Court's analysis of the SEC's post hoc basis for
Rule 14e-3 is flawed. The Government's prophylactic argument is inconsis-
tent with the language of Section 14e-3 and the SEC's purposes for promul-
gating Rule 14e-3. Likewise, the SEC's defining power assertion, the actual
grounds it gave for promulgating the Rule, fails to validate the action. Con-
gressional intent and the principles of deference to agency interpretations do
not support the contention that Section 14(e) grants the SEC the authority to
disregard the accepted definition of fraud and to create a duty for all investors
who possess material nonpublic information to either disclose the information
or refrain from trading.
punished as a public offense").
267. Touby, 500 U.S. at 166.
268. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1994) (defining punishment available against natural person for
willful violation of Act "or any rule or regulation thereunder"). Persons other than natural
persons are subject to a fine not exceeding $2,500,000. Id.
269. See Mallonee, 332 U.S. at 249 (emphasizing need for clear congressional intent with
delegation of power "to make federal crimes of acts that never had been such before and to
devise novel rules of law in a field in which there has been no settled law or custom").
270. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697-700 (1980) (stating that "it would take a very
clear expression in the legislative history of congressional intent to the contrary to justify the
conclusion that the statute does not mean what it so plainly seems to say"); Kurtz & Sleeper,
supra note 11, at 726 (noting that evaluation of legislative history is necessary to determine if
Congress intended SEC to interpret Section 14(e) in manner contrary to plain meaning of its
language).
271. See supra notes 196-262 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent
underlying Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3).
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The SEC overstepped its rulemaking authority when it promulgated
Rule 14e-3 without requiring a breach of a fiduciary duty as a predicate to
liability in nondisclosure situations. Despite the Supreme Court's ruling
in O'Hagan, the language of the enabling statute and the Rule, the legisla-
tive history behind the statute, and the policy objectives of Congress do not
support the contention that Section 14(e) grants the SEC the authority to act
in such a manner. O'Hagan's, Chestman's, Maio's, Ladavac's, and Peters's
actions may be wrong. Nonetheless, if Congress desires to implement a
disclose-or-abstain rule for tender offers, then it must make that intent clear
in an enabling statute. Because such congressional intent is absent, the
O'Hagan Court erred by not striking down the SEC's promulgation of
Rule 14e-3 as an ultra vires usurpation of power.
